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Some Realism About Professionalism: Core
Values, Legality, and Corporate Law Practice
CHRISTOPHER J. WHELANt
INTRODUCTION
There have long been tensions between the high ideals
of professionalism, the ideology of libertarianism, and the
realities of commercialism in law practice.' Traditionally,
lawyers have been called upon to be professional-entailing
some public service ideal-despite also making a living out
of the law.2 While the need to make a living has always
threatened to conflict with the aspirations of
professionalism, 3 the transformation of the structure and
organization of the legal profession in recent decades has
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1. John H. Wigmore, Introduction to ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, at xxi (1915) ("[i]n the dominant attitude, the Law is no more than
a trade, an occupation, a business .... ").
2. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)
(defining professionals as "a group ... pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of a public service-no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a
public service is the primary purpose.").
3. The classic studies are those by Jerome Carlin. See JEROME E. CARLIN,
LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO
(1962); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR (1966); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: THE SOLO PRACTITIONER
IN AN URBAN SETTING (1994).
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increased this threat.4 Large law firms, the subject of this
Article, "now inhabit a universe whose governing laws are
those of the market."5 Alongside this transformation has
been the "uncontrolled expansion of libertarian ideology
into lawyers' common consciousness." 6 This also threatens
to undermine professionalism by denying any public
obligation other than to serve the client. It has become,
arguably, the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role7
and the dominant ideology of legal practice.
I. CHALLENGING CORE VALUES
A. Libertarianism
A libertarian ideology "privatizes the lawyer's role,"8
and makes lawyers "private agents for private parties ... ;
our loyalties to clients must be absolute and undivided."9
Libertarians endorse "the traditional ethic,"1' first set out
in the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics: to give "entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
[the lawyer's] utmost learning and ability."'1 Zealousness, it
is claimed, is "the fundamental principle of the law of
4. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989). For especially good
accounts of this phenomenon, see ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
5. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER 42 (2004).
6. Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to
Kaye Scholer, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 320 (1998).
7. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 87-89 (3rd ed. 2001).
8. Gordon, supra note 6, at 321.
9. Id. at 320.
10. Monroe H. Freedman, The Ethical Danger of "Civility" and
' Professionalism," 6 CRIM. JUST. J. 17, 17 (1998).
11. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS EC 15 (1908). See generally, Susan D. Carle,
Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1999).
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lawyering."'12 It is proclaimed in Canon 7 of the Model Code:
"A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the
Bounds of the Law,"13 and in the preamble to the Model
Rules: "the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and
pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of
the law."14
A libertarian, client-centered ideology threatens to
undermine professionalism by denying any public
obligation other than to serve the client. It can also become
a "slippery slope" to excessive zeal and uncontrolled
instrumentalism. 15 The libertarian ethic demands that
lawyers do everything legally permissible to achieve their
client's objectives, including using any law or procedural
mechanism, regardless of its purpose, to the client's
advantage. 16
The ideology is at its most powerful when the lawyer
perceives that there is no choice but to do whatever will
assist the client. As Alan Dershowitz said: "What a defense
attorney 'may' do, he must do, if it is necessary to defend his
client."'17 While the ideology begins with a compelling and
powerful image of the criminal lawyer as "the fearless
advocate who champions a client threatened with loss of life
and liberty by government oppression,"' 8 it has been
extended to civil litigation 19 and beyond.20 Corporate
12. Freedman, supra note 10, at 17 (citing GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 17 (Supp. 1988)).
13. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (2003).
15. See David Luban, Milgram Revisited, RESEARCHING LAW, Spring 1998, at
1,9.
16. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM,
43-49 (1975); Abbe Smith, Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf
of People Who do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925 (2000); Harry I.
Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the "Right" to
Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 128 (1987).
17. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS 145 (1996).
18. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239,
1243 (1991).
19. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 1962)
(stating that there is no duty to notify the other side in a personal injury claim
of an immediate life-threatening condition). For a critique of this case, see
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lawyers may have a "moral imperative . . . to defy or
undercut the law."' 2 1 Of course, the libertarian model is only
one of several posited for lawyers. 22 Some have argued that
the context of legal practice is crucial, 23 and concern has
also been expressed as to whether or not such a model
should apply to corporate transaction lawyers. 24
B. Commercialism
In the context of large firm practice, a law firm's "sheer
size ... makes it difficult to achieve a consensus on values
beyond the common denominator of revenues and profit. '25
For the large firm lawyer, "eat what you kill" has become
the dominant ethic. 26 According to Milton C. Regan Jr.,
dramatic forces have "irrevocably transformed elite law
firm practice over the past quarter century."27 He cites
three structural factors that have affected large firm
practice in particular.
Roger C. Crampton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63 (1998).
20. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative
Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1 (1992)
(discussing ethical considerations in negotiations); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., How
Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in
Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1255-61 (1990) (discussing loyalty and zeal
as justification for lying in negotiations).
21. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor
After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1191-92 (2003).
22. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of
Legal Ethics, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529.
23. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After
Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993).
24. See Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just be Hired Guns, in
ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate
Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985); Robert A. Kagan
& Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37
STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985).
25. REGAN, supra note 5, at 39.
26. See generally id.
27. Id. at 4.
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First, there has developed a "tournament of lawyers,"28
a competition whereby lawyers compete with each other to
make partner.29 Even after making partner, it appears that
the tournament continues, as partners compete with each
other for compensation, status, and continued employment
in order to survive. 30
Secondly, lawyers' practice has become increasingly
specialized and lawyers may resolve issues and problems
differently depending upon that specialty.31 According to
this view, "[m]uch of law practice consists of informal
understandings about matters such as what arguments are
considered within the bounds of good faith, acceptable
levels of aggressiveness, the scope of disclosure
requirements, how to interact with regulatory agencies, and
what constitutes due diligence."32 In short, "[o]ver time, the
shared experiences of practitioners in a particular specialty
lead them to develop norms of acceptable behavior."33
Thirdly, lawyers often work with colleagues inside and
outside the firm in teams, working on increasingly large
and complex projects. Members of the team can become a
"significant reference group."34 Teams can shape individual
perceptions; members reinforce for one another "the idea
that their framework for interpreting events is accurate and
reasonable."35
The growth in competition in the legal marketplace,
within the law firm and beyond, has increased the
instability of large firm practice. Law firms seek to find and
28. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991).
29. See also David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the
Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the
Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).
30. See REGAN, supra note 5. A tournament may extend beyond the firm, via
the "ethics of grabbing and leaving." ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS:
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF GRABBING AND LEAVING 145 (1990). Some lawyers are
discarded from one firm while others are recruited from other firms. Id.
31. See REGAN, supra note 5, at 40.
32. Id. at 39.
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id. at 41-42.
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retain clients, while clients shop around for law firms 36 and
lawyers. 37 These "legal beauty contests ' 38 threaten to
undermine the professionalism of lawyers.
C. Professionalism and Core Values
Alongside these growing tensions and threats there has
been a focus on the so-called "core values" of the legal
profession. 39 According to former ABA President Philip S.
Anderson, there are four "core principles" in the legal
profession. 40 First, "[t]he practice of law is a learned
profession." 41 It requires specialized training and the
"lawyer must gain an understanding of the shared values of
the profession."42 Second, a lawyer must be independent.
The "lawyer must zealously represent the client;"43 strict
confidentiality must be maintained; and conflicts of interest
must be "avoided absolutely."44 The lawyer must "control
the advice given to a client because the lawyer's judgment
must be based solely on the legal and factual circumstances
attending a matter and not on untoward influences of
another sort."45 Third, "[t]he practice of law must be
governed by ethical principles." 46  Lawyers must be
regulated "to ensure competence and ethical conduct." 47
36. See Kagan & Rosen, supra note 24, at 423.
37. See Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1201, 1210 (1997); Milton C. Regan Jr., Foreword: Professional
Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 198
(2000); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment
and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989).
38. Kenneth D. Agran, The Treacherous Path to the Diamond-Studded
Tiara: Ethical Dilemmas in Legal Beauty Contests, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1307, 1307 (1996).
39. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1389 (1992) (referring to the bar's "constitutional norms").
40. Philip S. Anderson, Remarks, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Id.
1072 [Vol. 54
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Regulation "promotes the concept that a lawyer serves the
public interest in addition to the client."48 Fourth, "[a]
lawyer has an obligation to the public in addition to
obligations to a particular client, and a lawyer has
responsibility to respect the concept of the rule of law."49 The
"legal profession, operating within the rule of law and a
transparent system of justice, strengthens the disparate
institutions of the world's governments and reenforces [sic]
the fabric of society."50
For some, focusing on core values has been a positive
development: "[i]t is in the public interest to preserve the
core values of the legal profession. '51 Core values are
48. Id. at 45.
49. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 45. Anderson hoped for "universal agreement" on these principles
and they seem to capture the common ground. See, e.g., James W. Jones &
Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A "Radical" Proposal to
Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1159, 1189, 1196 (2000) (noting that "core values include preserving the
independence of professional judgment; assuring competence in the delivery of
legal services; maintaining client confidences; maintaining truthfulness and fair
dealing in relations with clients, tribunals, and others; abiding by the rules of
tribunals; assisting in providing access to justice and improving the justice
system; and providing a framework to support the ethical behavior of individual
lawyers.").
51. American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility,
Recommendations, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20050211015424/
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecomlOf.html (this document is no longer
available on the American Bar Association's web page, but is has been archived
on the Waybackmachine's web page; go to Internet Archive: Waybackmachine,
at http://www.archive.org/web/web.php, in the search field, enter
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecoml0f.html, then in the results, click on Oct.
09, 2002). Among the core values are:
a. the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to the client;
b. the lawyer's duty competently to exercise independent professional
judgment for the benefit of the client;
c. the lawyer's duty to hold client confidences inviolate;
d. the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest with the client; I
e. the lawyer's duty to help maintain a single profession of law with
responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice[;]
f. the lawyer's duty to promote access to justice.
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"essential to the competent, responsible, and effective
delivery of legal services to clients. '5 2 They are said to be
universal in character, transcending national borders.53 For
example, an independent legal profession "is an essential
means of safeguarding human rights in face of the power of
the state and other interests in society."54 Core values
reflect the high ideals of professionalism. 55 As Anderson put
it, the core values of the legal profession mean that the
"profession of law is more than a job; it is a high calling."56
The legal community, however, is facing a "spiritual
crisis that strikes at the heart of professional pride. ' 57 The
core values of the legal profession are said to be under
attack. 58 Some have questioned their role and whether, in
the future, the profession can and should preserve them. 59
While some have argued that core values should be
preserved by lawyers, including in-house counsel,60 others
have not. According to Nathan M. Crystal, reliance on core
values in debates about legal ethics reflects an anti-market,
anti-competitive attitude of the bar; reliance "has rhetorical
appeal but is fundamentally misleading. ' 61 Deborah L.
Rhode and Paul D. Paton observe that "[t]he challenges of
52. Jones & Manning, supra note 50, at 1179.
53. See Anderson, supra note 40.
54. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (1998),
available at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/EnIcode2002-en.pdf.
55. See Professionalism Symposium, 52 S.C. L. REV. 443 (2001).
56. Anderson, supra note 40, at 45; see also Professional Responsibility:
Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162 (1958) ("Private legal
practice, properly pursued is . . . itself a public service."); Symposium, Can the
Ordinary Practice of Law be a Religious Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373-559
(2005).
57. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 2 (1993).
58. Rupert Woolf, former President of the CCBE: "we will need to defend the
core values of the profession, namely independence, autonomy, self-regulation
and respect for the rule of law." A Message from the President, 1 CCBE GAZETTE
1 (2001) (on file with the author).
59. See Jones & Manning, supra note 50, at 1179.
60. See Anderson supra note 40; see also Mary C. Daly, The Cultural,
Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role
of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057 (1997).
61. Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
747, 748 (2001).
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maintaining independent judgment are compounded in a
competitive market where powerful clients can shop for
expedient advice. ' 62  According to Richard L. Abel,
"[a]lthough the 'independence' of lawyers remains an
unquestioned shibboleth, it may express nostalgia more
than it describes contemporary reality."63
D. Core Values in Context: Large Law Firm Corporate Law
Practice
But what are the contemporary realities in large, law
firm practice? Given the tensions between professionalism,
libertarianism, and commercialism, how do large firm
corporate lawyers "identify, frame, and resolve ethical
questions? '64 If core values exist, what form do they take
and how should they be characterized?
Addressing these questions requires empirical data on
"the dynamics of professional behavior in the legal
workplace," 65 something that is not readily available or easy
to obtain. As a result, not surprisingly perhaps, "[o]ne of the
big problems is that we mostly rely on post-hoc horror
stories about what has gone wrong and use those stories to
analyze the nature of the problem. ' 66 Such was the case,
par excellence, with Enron's bankruptcy 67 and "spectacular
fall from grace. ' 68 It spawned a legal literature which has
62. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 625, 642 (Nancy B.
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, eds., 2004).
63. ABEL, supra note 4, at 9; see also, Jones & Manning, supra note 50, at
1179 ("The prototype of the independent general practitionerlitigator-
although continuing to resonate as a kind of mythic paradigm within the legal
profession-was, in reality, no longer representative of what most American
lawyers actually do.").
64. REGAN, supra note 5, at 4.
65. Robert L. Nelson, Professionalism from a Social Science Perspective, 52
S.C. L. REV. 473, 479 (2001).
66. Id. at 479.
67. For an accessible overview of the story of Enron's bankruptcy, see BRIAN
CRUVER, ANATOMY OF GREED: THE UNSHREDDED TRUTH FROM AN ENRON INSIDER
(2002). For a journalistic perspective on Enron's bankruptcy, see KURT
EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS (2005).
68. Julie Rawe, The Case Against Ken Lay, TIME, July 19, 2004, at 62, 63
(quoting U.S. Deputy Attorney General James Comey).
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become, according to Donald C. Langevoort, "voluminous,
both in terms of official investigations and academic
commentary."69 Its "greatest legacy" 70 was the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which empowered the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to issue rules "setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing
and practicing before the Commission."'71
Therefore, it might appear that there is little left to
learn about Enron. In fact, Enron remains an important
case study because of the exhaustive and highly
authoritative Final Report of Neal Batson, the Court-
Appointed Examiner (the Examiner) in the Enron
bankruptcy case. 72 Batson was appointed on May 22, 2002;
the Final Report was published on November 3, 2003. 73 He
was authorized to investigate all transactions involving
special purpose vehicles or entities (SPEs) created or
structured by-or at the behest of-Enron and certain of its
affiliates and those individuals, institutions, and
professionals involved therein.74 What was new in Batson's
Report 75 was that it detailed the specific role played by
69. Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of
Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2004). Books on
Enron have become "their own cottage industry." See Jeffery D. Van Niel &
Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 77, 87; see also id. at 87 n.36 (A
search of Amazon.com in May 2003, using an "Enron" search, found in excess of
fifty publications).
70. Rawe, supra note 68, at 62, 63.
71. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 307,
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
72. Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron
Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Final Report],
available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examinerfinal.html (last visited Oct.
18, 2006); see also Charles J. Tabb, The Enron Bankruptcy, in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIAscOs AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 303, 310
(discussing the trend in cases of alleged corporate wrongdoing to appoint
examiners for investigative purposes).
73. Final Report, supra note 72, at 1.
74. Id.
75. The Examiner published three Interim Reports. The first, filed Sept. 21,
2002, examined six SPE transactions; the second, submitted on Jan. 21, 2003,
focused on substantially all Enron's material SPE transactions identified to
date; the third, submitted on June 30, 2003, focused primarily on certain
persons and entities that might have responsibility for Enron's misuse of its
1076 [Vol. 54
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Enron's attorneys in aspects of Enron's "development, use,
approval, oversight and disclosure of the SPEs."76
Enron retained "hundreds of outside law firms." 77
"Outside attorneys were chosen based upon the level of
expertise within the law firm and its availability."7 8 The
Examiner, however, specifically considered the role of
Enron's in-house attorneys and two of its outside law firms,
Vinson & Elkins and Andrews & Kurth.79 He examined the
evidence which could form the basis of claims, as well as the
several possible defenses to such claims.
The Examiner's investigation was exhaustive. It cost
over $100 million, "almost certainly the most expensive
inquiry of its nature in U.S. history."8 0 It was undertaken
by Batson and a team of professionals from his firm of
Alston & Bird.8 ' The team included over thirty-five partners
SPE structures. See Final Report, supra note 72, at 2-6. In the Interim Reports,
the Examiner found evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that
certain senior officers of Enron breached their fiduciary duties by causing
Enron to enter the SPE transactions that were designed to manipulate Enron's
financial statements and that resulted in the dissemination of materially
misleading financial information. See id. at 4. The Final Report constituted the
fourth and final report together with the prior reports.
76. Final Report, supra note 72, at 22; see also id. app. C (discussing the role
of Enron's attorneys and other persons and entities that may have liability).
77. Id. app. C, at 15 n.17 (quoting sworn statement of Rex Rogers, Vice
President and Associate General Counsel); see also id. at 48.
78. Id. app. C, at 15 (quoting testimony of Carol Lynne St Clair, former
Assistant General Counsel, Enron and Scott Matthew Sefton, former General
Counsel, Enron).
79. See id. at 48. Andrews & Kurth (presently Andrews Kurth) was founded
in 1902. It has seven offices, including one in London, 400 attorneys, an
international clientele, and it "represents the vital interests of established
companies and emerging businesses around the globe." Andrews Kurth LLP,
http://akllp.com/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2006). This Article focuses on Vinson &
Elkins as the larger of the two, and as Enron's "primary outside law firm."
Other large law firms referred to in the Final Report include Shearman &
Sterling, id. app. C, at 69, Kirkland & Ellis, id. app. C, at 116, 125-27, 147
n.651, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, id. app. C, at 127, 147, 157-58,
and Bracewell & Patterson, id. app. C., at 147 n.651.
80. Anthony Lin, Enron Examiner Billed Estate for $100 Million, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 5, 2003, available at http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=1069801691295.
81. R. Neal Batson is a partner, Chair of the American College of
Bankruptcy, member of the National Banking Conference and former member
of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See
Tabb, supra note 72, at 310. Alston & Bird is another large law firm. Founded
1078 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
and counsel, thirty-three associates, and four contracted
attorneys.8 2 The Examiner subpoenaed documents from
forty-six law firms.8 3 He conducted interviews and reviewed
testimony (presented to the SEC, in the numerous Senate
and House committees that investigated Enron,8 4 in the
course of litigation,8 5 and from about 300 witnesses8 6 ), the
Powers Report,8 7 millions of e-mails,8 8 and Vinson & Elkins
billings. More than forty million pages of documents were
amassed8 9 in the Enron litigation.90 The Examiner obtained
material that is "off limits to litigants," because it was
obtained subject to confidentiality agreements. 91
in 1893, it has about 700 lawyers, though no offices abroad. Alston & Bird LLP,
http://www.alston.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=main (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
82. See Lin, supra note 80, at 1.
83. See Tabb, supra note 72, at 311.
84. See, e.g., The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 2: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002). This Senate subcommittee had up to twenty
staff people "trying to unravel Enron," according to Mr. Peter Deutsch. Id. at 4;
see also Lessons Learned from Enron: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Government Affairs 107th Cong. (2002).
85. For example, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, Transcript of the
Proceedings, No. H-02-121, May 6-June 5, 2002 (S.D. Tex. 2002); United States
v. Glisan, Cr. No. H-03-3628 (S.D. Tex., Filed Sept. 10, 2003). Several class
action lawsuits were filed on behalf of shareholders and employees. See Final
Report, supra note 72, at 17 n.35.
86. See Richard Acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat, A.B.A. J., June 2004,
at 22.
87. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP.
(2002) [hereinafter POWERS REPORT], available at http://news.findlaw.com
/hdocs/docs/enronlsicreport/.
88. See Panel Four: Rule 37 and/or a New Rule 34.1: Safe Harbors for E-
Document Preservation and Sanctions, 73 FORD. L. REV. 71, 78 (2004) (noting
that one of the databases Batson's team put together contained 7,366,177 e-mail
messages).
89. See id. at 78. For a readily-accessible source of various Enron-related
documents, see www.enron.com/corp/por/supporting.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2006).
90. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 310 F. Supp.2d 819, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
91. Lin, supra note 80, at 2.
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The Final Report itself, including Appendices, is 1,114
pages in length. 92 Appendix C, dealing exclusively with the
role of Enron's attorneys, is nearly 250 pages. When the
Final Report was published, it was described as "a
remarkable (though very complex) case study by an
independent, well-funded team of lawyers. It provides a
look at the world of high-end business and corporate
lawyers of the type we almost never get in public, not even
in a malpractice trial."93
Enron's attorneys generally played a "vital role in
Enron's access to the capital markets" 94 by analyzing the
structure of the SPE transactions, documenting them, and
providing opinions on various transactions. According to the
Examiner, "an attorney's willingness to provide certain
legal opinions was, as a practical matter, crucial to Enron's
ability to complete the FAS 140 Transactions. '" 95 Without
these opinions, Enron would probably not have proceeded
with the transactions. 96
FAS 140 Transactions were structured finance
transactions that were designed to comply with either FAS
125 or its successor, FAS 140. 9 7 These transactions were a
key technique Enron officers used to enhance Enron's
reported financial condition, results of operations, and cash
92. The Final Report, together with the Interim Reports, total over 4,000
pages in length. See Final Report, supra note 72.
93. William Freivogel & Lucian Pera, Enron Watch/Sarbanes-Oxley, ETHICS
AND LAWYERING, Dec. 2003, http://www.ethicsandlawyering.com/Issues/
1203.htm.
94. Final Report, supra note 72, at 114.
95. Id. app. C, at 27.
96. The opinions were required so that Andersen could account for these
transactions in the way certain Enron officers required. Id. app. C, at 31.
97. Id. app. C, at 26 n.67; see also ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND
SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 125 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1996) [hereinafter FAS 125]; ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES-A REPLACEMENT OF
FASB STATEMENT 125, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2000). The standards distinguishes between
transfers that are sales and those that are secured borrowings. In FAS 140
transactions, Enron obtained funds-"monetized"-a variety of otherwise
illiquid assets, "removing those assets from its balance sheet while at the same
time retaining control over them with a view towards better timing the final
sale of those assets." Final Report, supra note 72, app C, at 26.
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flow. In 2000, for example, FAS 140 Transactions increased
reported income by $350 million, increased cash flow by
more than $1 billion, and kept more than $1 billion off
Enron's balance sheet. 98
Enron officers were often more concerned with
justifying a desired result rather than making the correct or
best decision.99 To achieve this, they used accounting rules
that did not directly address the accounting question at
issue, but provided an argument to justify an aggressive
position. They also searched for reasons to avoid public
disclosure. The obtaining of professional opinions or advice
in the process was "merely . . . a necessary procedural
step"'10 0 used "to justify questionable decisions rather than
as a tool to assist them in reaching a considered business
decision based upon the risks."'01
In most of its FAS 140 Transactions, Enron asked its
outside attorneys to provide an opinion letter that Arthur
Andersen, its auditor, would use to satisfy the isolation
requirements of FAS 140.102 If Andersen was not satisfied
that the asset had been legally isolated, Enron could not
record a gain from the transfer of the asset. It would have
to reflect a debt on its balance sheet and record the
proceeds of the transaction as a cash flow from financing
activities. 103
According to the Examiner, Enron needed opinions
from a law firm because "a determination about whether
the isolation criterion has been met to support a conclusion
regarding surrender of control is largely a matter of law.
This aspect of surrender of control, therefore, is assessed
primarily from a legal perspective."'1 4 Vinson & Elkins
98. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. B, at 85 (discussing the role of
Arthur Anderson).
99. See Final Report, supra note 72, at 94.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 99.
102. See id. app. C, at 28.
103. See id.
104. The Audit Issues Task Force of the Auditing Standards Board, AU
Section 9336. Interpretations of Section 336, Using the Work of a Specialist: (AU
§ 9336) (AICPA, Professional Standards) (interpretations of Using the Work of a
Specialist, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 73 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
1080 [Vol. 54
2007] SOME REALISM ABO UT PROFESSIONALISM 1081
provided Enron with true issuance opinion letters in
relation to Project Cornhusker, and in a number of similar
transactions in 1997, 1998, and 1999. It knew Enron would
provide these opinions to Andersen to support the
accountancy treatment Enron sought.105  Enron was
permitted to provide Andersen with a copy of each FAS 140
opinion and Andersen was permitted to use the opinion
''solely as evidential support in determining the appropriate
accounting and financial reporting treatment of the
transactions."106
Rendering legal opinions is an important part of
general practice. Opinions can be used not only to interpret
the law or to analyze the legal nature of a particular
transaction or relationship. They can also be employed as a
defensive strategy-a form of insurance. An opinion can be
used to argue that actions taken were technically correct. If
that is contested, it at least shows that the action was
arguably correct and taken in good faith. Opinions thus are
useful in negotiations to compromise or settle a dispute,
and to avoid a case going to court. In a financial reporting
context, legal opinions can be used to challenge auditors
who might take a different view of the nature of a
transaction or relationship.
Attorneys often render opinions concerning compliance
by their clients with federal securities laws: "legal opinions
are often essential to the completion of the transaction, and
the parties and the investing public look to the opinion as
the authoritative statement that the matters opined upon
are in order."'10 7 Delivering legal opinions is a manifestation
of the lawyer's gatekeeper role: "the legal opinion of the
reputational intermediary is deemed trustworthy because
the parties know that the attorney has a greater stake in its
Accountants 1994) (AU, § 336). This interpretation was cited by Enron's
Examiner in the Final Report. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 28 n.71.
105. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 31.
106. Id. app. C, at 31 n.83 (internal quotations omitted).
107. Attorney's Conduct in Issuing an Opinion Letter Without Conducting
an Inquiry of Underlying Facts Failed to Comport With Applicable Standards of
Conduct, Exchange Act Release No. 17831, 22 SEC Docket 1200 (June 1, 1981),
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/mbonds/bc.htm.
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own reputation than in the particular transaction."'1 0 8
Opinions have to be from outside counsel to indicate that
the opinion is independent of the client: "independence of
the attorney is critical to the gatekeeping function."109
In the classic phrase of Judge Henry Friendly,
[i]n our complex society . . . the lawyer's opinion can be [an]
instrument for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the
chisel or the crowbar . . . . Congress equally could not have
intended that men holding themselves out as members of these
ancient professions [the accounting and legal professions] should
be able to escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when
they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have
represented a knowledge they knew they did not possess. 110
Under Texas law, an attorney can commit legal
malpractice by giving an erroneous legal opinion. 1'
Although lawyers' responsibilities can vary significantly
depending on the identity of the opinion recipient, 112 if the
recipient is the client, the opinion giver has a "paramount
duty, based on the professional responsibility of the
attorney to the client," 113 and the principles which apply to
giving opinions "should apply with even more force." 1 4
The principles are that the attorney who prepares or
reviews a legal opinion should "exercise good professional
judgment and give careful and thoughtful attention to the
language and meaning of the opinion, as well as any factual
investigation and legal research necessary to support the
108. Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why
Attorneys Who Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are "Selling Out,"
Not "Buying In," 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 928 (2003).
109. Id. at 929.
110. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
111. Kimleco Petroleum, Inc. v. Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921, 923
(Tex. App. 2002); see also Final Report, supra note 72, app C, annex 1, at 26
n.67.
112. State Bar of Texas, Business Law Section, Report of the Legal Opinions
Committee Regarding Legal Opinions in Business Transactions, 15-16 (1992)
[hereinafter Texas Report]; see also Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, annex
1, at 26-28.
113. Texas Report, supra note 112, at 16.
114. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, annex 1, at 30.
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opinion."115 The duty to "conduct a reasonable investigation
of the relevant facts to support the decision" is
"fundamental."116
E. Questions, Aims and Findings
This Article focuses on the role played by Vinson &
Elkins, "the outside law firm Enron turned to with the
greatest frequency on a wide range of matters."117 Founded
in Houston in 1917, it is, by any definition, a large law firm.
It had, during the period of this case study, more than 800
attorneys organized into seventy core practice areas. 118
Vinson & Elkins views itself as a global law firm. It has
offices in ten cities in the United States and abroad,
including Beijing, Dubai, London, Moscow, and Singapore.
It was one of the first U.S. law firms to establish a multi-
national partnership under the rules of the English Law
Society." 9 It is a firm that takes pride in itself. Its website
noted that seventy-two of its lawyers appeared in the 2001-
02 edition of Best Lawyers in America and that it ranked
consistently as "one of the leading law firms of the
world."' 20 Shortly after the date the Final Report was
published, it described itself as "among the world's major
law firms .... The firm's clients include the governments of
sovereign nations and North American states, as well as
cities and municipalities, public and private companies
from around the world, domestic and international financial
institutions, entrepreneurial enterprises and
individuals."121
115. Texas Report, supra note 112, at 14.
116. Id. at 38-39.
117. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, annex. 1, at 21.
118. Id. app. C, at 21 n.47.
119. See http://www.vinson-elkins.com/firm-overview/firmoverview.cfm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
120. Vinson & Elkins LLP, Firm Overview, http://www.vinson-
elkins.comloverview/overview.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). Later in 2004, the
website stated that Vinson & Elkins had over 750 lawyers and that ninety-five
of them appear in the 2003-04 edition. See Vinson & Elkins LLP,
Rankings/Awards, http://www.vinson-elkins.com/overview/rankings. asp (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006).
121. Vinson & Elkins LLP, Firm Overview, http://web.archive.org/web/
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Since then, its "General Firm Rankings" include the
following: "ranked #1 in the world by number of deals in
Infrastructure Journals 2003 Half-Year League Tables;"
Euromoney "named four V&E partners in its The Best of
the Best 2002, which identifies the worlds leading 25
practitioners across 13 areas of law," and named the firm as
"The Worlds Leading Energy Law Firm;" Thomson
Financial ranks the firm "among the top three law firms
worldwide in dollar value of Worldwide Equity Issuance by
U.S. Issuers for the first half of 2003" and "among the top
five law firms worldwide in dollar value of 2002 Initial
Public Offerings by U.S. Issuers;" The American Lawyer
ranks the firms corporate practice area "first in the nation
for IPOs worldwide."'1 22 As the firm itself puts it, "[w]hen it
comes to handling the biggest corporate deals, Vinson &
Elkins ranks high among the elite international law
firms."1
2 3
Vinson & Elkins also takes pride in its culture. It
emphasizes that the firm "operates on the premise that
good attorneys are first good citizens."'124 The firm's "First
Principles" include a commitment "to the highest ethical
standards, both in our service to clients and in our personal
lives."'125 In large law firms, such as Vinson & Elkins, the
credentials of attorneys, in terms of core values such as
learning and competence, are not normally a significant
20040204170954/http://www.vinson-elkins.com/firmoverview/firmOverview
.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (Vinson & Elkins' current Overview no longer
contains the exact quote contained in this Article).
122. Including Joseph C. Dilg, Vinson & Elkins' Enron relationship partner,
referred to later in the context of this case study. Vinson & Elkins LLP,
Rankings/Awards, http://www.vinson-elkins.com/overview/rankings-detail.asp?
title=Best+of+the+Best (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
123. Vinson & Elkins LLP, Rankings/Awards, http://www.vinson-
elkins.com/overview/rankings-detail.asp?title=Corporate+Control+Alert (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006).
124. Vinson & Elkins LLP, Firm Overview, http://web.archive.org/web/
20040204170954/http://www.vinsonelkins.comfirmoverview/firmoverview.cfm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2006). The website now refers to "First Principles,"
including a commitment to "the highest ethical standards." Vinson & Elkins
LLP, First Principles, http://www.vinson-elkins.com/overview/overview-pages.
asp?page-name=First%20Principles (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
125. Id.
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issue.126 Similarly, in the Enron case at least, there were
few, if any, issues of confidentiality or lawyer conflicts. 1 2 7
The focus in this Article, therefore, is on other core values
which lie at the heart of legal professionalism, particularly
the exercise of independent professional judgment and
respect for the rule of law.
Independence is said to be at the heart of Western legal
professionalism. According to the Council of the Bars and
Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE), an
independent legal profession "is an essential means of
safeguarding human rights in [the] face of the power of the
state and other interests in society."' 28 In representing a
client, a lawyer should exercise independent professional
judgment, 29 free from undue influence by the client. The
"lawyer's judgment must be based solely on the legal and
factual circumstances attending a matter and not on
untoward influences of another sort."' 30
Respect for the rule of law is similarly valued.1 3 1
According to David B. Wilkins, "standard rule-of-law
values" are invoked and followed by the "traditional model"
of legal ethics. 32 It is the lawyer's responsibility to respect
the rule of law and to operate within it. Doing so is a
central part of the lawyer's public obligation: 33 "The lawyer
is, by vocation, committed to the law."' 34 Compliance with
126. Though see text accompanying note 236 below, where the lack of legal
and business experience is briefly addressed.
127. There may, of course, have been conflicts between managers and the
corporation.
128. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION R. 1.1 (1998),
available at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/Encode2002-en.pdf. According to the
American Bar Association, an independent legal profession is "an important
force in preserving government under law." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
pmbl. para. 11 (2003).
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980).
130. Anderson, supra note 40, at 44.
131. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION R. 1.1
(1998), available at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/En/code2002-en.pdf.
132. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV.
468, 473 (1990).
133. Anderson, supra note 40, at 44.
134. Gordon, supra note 21, at 1200.
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regulation also promotes the concept that a lawyer serves
the public interest, in addition to the client. 135
The Article explores these two key core values of the
legal profession in the context of the relationship between
Vinson & Elkins and Enron (Part II). The analysis suggests
that core values do play a significant role in corporate law
practice but in unexpected ways. Therefore, I argue that
core values need to be re-conceptualized (Part III). On the
one hand, they promote a professionalism ideology that has
an impact on the lawyer-client relationship. On the other
hand, somewhat surprisingly, this ideology serves to
undermine the public interest role implicit in
professionalism. The reason is that lawyers define their role
in terms of the law, of what the law allows, and predictions
of what the law will be. Corporate lawyers are legal realists.
The problem of their behavior is not one of deviance-
breaking the rules-but of compliance-delivering legality.
Therefore, some realism about professionalism is
needed (Part IV). The regulation of corporate lawyers is less
a problem of lawyers as professionals than it is a problem of
law and its capacity to control. This analysis has significant
implications for the regulation of lawyers, law firms, and
the legal profession.
II. CORE VALUES IN CONTEXT
The principles underpinning legal opinion practice
resonate with key core values of the legal profession, such
as the exercise of independent professional judgment,
basing that judgment solely on the legal and factual
circumstances attending the matter and not on untoward
influences of another sort, and operating within the rule of
law. In this Part, I explore these core values in the practical
context of this case study and of the Vinson & Elkins
lawyer and Enron client relationship.
A. Client Influence
Large clients can put enormous economic pressure
overtly and covertly on employees and their advisers, inside
and outside. The compensation system for corporate officers
135. Anderson, supra note 40, at 45.
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in many large corporations is set by "financial metrics ...
as a means of aligning the interests of management with
those of shareholders."'136 In fact, Enron's system of
compensation was not only tied to Enron's reported
financial results, it "placed the highest emphasis" on
them.137 The Enron compensation structure "depended
heavily on the reported financial performance of the
company."138
The former Vice President of Tax characterized how
Enron found the transactions originating in the tax
department-where officers and employees understood the
important nexus between stock price and compensation:
"kind of like cocaine-they got kind of hooked on it."'139 In the
three-year period between 1998-2000, a group of twenty-one
officers received in excess of $1 billion in the form of salary,
bonus and gross proceeds from sales of Enron stock; in
2000, Kenneth Lay received compensation valued at over
$33 million and Jeffrey Skilling over $17 million.140
According to Lay's Chief of Staff, the compensation
system produced
[a] near mercenary culture which encourages organizations to hide
problems (until those problems have become very big), discourages
cooperation and teamwork, and drives off people who demand at least a
modicum of civility in their work environment. 1
4 1
It appears that the compensation system also "proved to
be an overpowering motivation for implementing SPE
transactions that distorted Enron's reported financial
results."142 The Enron compensation program, however,
"was not atypical in scope or design as compared to
programs of other large public companies at the time."'1 43
The motivation to manipulate earnings and cash flows is
136. Final Report, supra note 72, at 90.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 92.
139. Id. at 90 n.164.
140. Id. at 91.
141. Id. at 90 (e-mail from Steven J. Kean to Kenneth Lay, Enron, Aug. 17,
2001, at 1).
142. Id. at 91.
143. Id. at 92.
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not atypical either, nor is the "allure" of the SPE
transactions. 144
Enron put economic pressure on outsiders as well.
Analysts reported pressure from superiors not to issue or
publish negative comments or research, "due to the
importance of Enron as an investment banking client."145 A
specific example involved Merrill Lynch which, in April
1998, had been excluded as a manager for an upcoming
$750 million common stock offering because Enron's senior
management was angry with the reports and comments of
John Olson, Merrill Lynch's equity analyst covering Enron.
After a call from Merrill Lynch's Chief Executive Officer to
Enron's CEO, Merrill Lynch was added as a manager for
the offering. One month later, Olson was fired and replaced
with an analyst "with a better opinion of Enron's stock."146
Merrill Lynch's revenues from Enron increased from $3
million in 1998 to $40 million in 1999.
Andrew Fastow, Enron's Chief Financial Officer, in
particular, was perceived to have used his and Enron's
authority to exert pressure. Several bank representatives
described the pressure he exerted on them to invest in
LJM.147 Apparently, banks understood that investing in
LJM would "help their prospects for securing business with
Enron."148 Fastow also had final authority on the
evaluations and bonuses of individuals negotiating on
Enron's behalf in the LJM transactions. 149 As a result, the
perception was that they "might shrink" from their
responsibility to vigorously protect Enron's interests.1 50
Of course, bankers and employees are not under a duty
to exercise independent judgment in the same way as
professionals such as Vinson & Elkins and Arthur
144. See id. at 93.
145. Id. at 101 n.192 (Jill Sakel, fixed income analyst, Credit Suisse First
Boston).
146. Id.
147. See id. app. C, at 169 n.778 (Jeffrey M. McMahon, Enron employee).
148. Id. app. C, at 169 n.780 (McMahon).
149. For a discussion of the Enron "culture," see ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE
DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 12 (2002).
150. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 169 (McMahon); see also id.
app. C, at 169 n.777.
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Andersen are supposed to. That does not mean
professionals are not subject to client pressure. Apparently,
"very few people [were] betting on" a "very junior person"
who made trouble by questioning the Condor transaction
being employed by Andersen "after January 1st."151
The concept of independence lies at the "foundation of
the public accounting profession, and the critical
importance of auditor independence is widely accepted."'152
Although Andersen regarded itself as independent within
the rules,153 the Examiner questioned whether Andersen
consistently maintained, in fact, the "independence in
mental attitude" required under professional standards. 154
Indeed, by using its economic power, Enron officers were
able to pressure third parties, including professionals, to
accommodate Enron's financial statement objectives. In
many instances, use of economic power "appears
responsible for overcoming concerns about reputational risk
or other reservations by these third parties."'155
Could this have been because of the close personal and
financial links between professionals and client? Between
1989 and 2000, "at least 86 Andersen accountants left
Andersen to join Enron, some of whom became key
executives in Enron's accounting and treasury functions. 156
The fees Andersen received from Enron were rising rapidly
in the period shortly before Enron's bankruptcy: $26.5
million in 1998; $46.4 million in 1999; and $47.9 million in
2000.157 The majority of these fees came from attesting
151. Id. at 102 (e-mail from Joel Ephross, Assistant General Counsel,
Enron, to Fernando Tovar, Vinson & Elkins, Dec. 3, 1999).
152. Id. app. B, at 31.
153. See id. app. B, at 36.
154. See id. app. B, at 37. The standard is set out in The Second General
Standard of GAAS: "In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence
in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors." CODIFICATION
OF AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS
No. 1 § 220.01 (Am. Inst. Of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972); see also Final
Report, supra note 72, at 32.
155. Final Report, supra note 72, at 94.
156. Id. at 39.
157. Id. The Examiner put Andersen's fees from its engagement with Enron
during 2000 at around $54 million. Id. app. B, at 9; see also id. app. B, at 28-31.
In February 2001, 113 Andersen professional personnel were deployed. Id. app.
B, at 9.
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Enron's internal controls and financial statements and from
consulting on the SPE transactions. 158 Enron was described
by Andersen as its largest client "by a wide margin in Fiscal
1999."159
Vinson & Elkins had personal and financial links with
Enron similar to, or possibly even greater than, those of
Andersen. As many as 20 Vinson & Elkins lawyers joined
Enron,160 most notably James V. Derrick. Derrick had
practiced general business law with Vinson & Elkins from
1971 before joining Enron as General Counsel in 1991.161
During the first few months after Enron Global Finance
(EGF) was created in the third quarter of 1999, its legal
department was partly staffed with attorneys loaned from
Vinson & Elkins and Andrews Kurth. 16 2 Each attorney in
EGF Legal reported to the General Counsel of EGF
Legal. 16 3 Although they were loaned, they continued to bill
as outside counsel. 6 4
Like Andersen, Vinson & Elkins received a rapidly
increasing level of fees from Enron between 1997 and 2001.
Indeed, the fees more than doubled from just over $18.5
million in 1997 to over $42 million in 2000.165 Apparently,
Enron represented 7% of Vinson & Elkins revenue, while
only 1% of Andersen's. 16 6 On this basis, if any of the
professionals should have succumbed to Enron's pressure, it
should have been Vinson & Elkins (or other outside
attorneys 6 7).
158. See id. at 39.
159. Id.
160. See Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, V&E Closes Book on Enron, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2002, at 16.
161. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 16 n.20.
162. See id. app. C, at 19 (Joel Ephross, Senior Counsel, Enron Global
Finance).
163. See id.
164. See id. app. C, at 19 n.37.
165. The figures for Vinson & Elkins LLP each year were as follows: 1997:
$18,586,479; 1998: $26,645,963; 1999: $37,840,290; 2000: $42,789,338; 2001:
$36,368,833. Id. app. C, at 21.
166. See CRUVER, supra note 67, at 287.
167. Andrews & Kurth's fees rose even more rapidly than Vinson & Elkins,
during the same period, though from a much lower base. In 1997, fees were just
less than $1 million. By 2000, they had grown to well over $9 million. The
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It is significant, therefore, that the Examiner did not
criticize Vinson & Elkins for a failure of "independence in
mental attitude" or for shrinking under economic pressure.
Neither overt nor covert economic client pressure appears
to have unduly influenced the exercise of Vinson & Elkins'
attorneys' professional judgment. There can, however, be
other, more subtle, factors which may significantly
influence how professional judgment is exercised. The first
relates to the complexity of the transactions in which Enron
was engaged.
B. Complexity
Vinson & Elkins (and Andrews & Kurth) were asked to
provide for Enron the opinion letters that Andersen would
use to satisfy the isolation requirements of FAS 140 in part
because these transactions were not simple ones. They
would not have been needed had the transactions not been
complex. Vinson & Elkins had been provided with a copy of
Andersen's internal memorandum dated April 1998 which
confirmed that "[t]ransactions that would not require a
legal letter are limited to transactions such as the simple
sale of equity or debt securities." 168  An Andersen
publication 69  which accompanied the memorandum
emphasized that opinions on whether assets transferred
met the requirements of FAS 125 (the predecessor of FAS
140), which was in effect for many of the transactions,
"must be from counsel . . . with sufficient expertise . . . to
make the determination ... whether the transaction would
be viewed as a sale and not as a secured borrowing if the
seller enters bankruptcy."'170
Vinson & Elkins knew, therefore, that it was being
asked for opinions in the context of complex transactions.
However, part of Enron's strategy was to embrace
figures each year were as follows: 1997: $991,053; 1998: $2,355,399; 1999:
$6,644,267; 2000: $9,740,414; 2001: $9,269,594. Final Report, supra note 72,
app. C, at 25.
168. Id. app. C, at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting an Andersen FAS 125
Memorandum dated Apr. 27, 1998, 66).
169. Financial Assets and Liabilities, Sales, Transfers and Extinguishments:
Interpretation of FASB Statement 125. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. C,
at 28 n.72.
170. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 28 n.72.
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complexity. Indeed, "[t]he 'tangled web' created by the
complexity and magnitude of the [SPE] structures was
extraordinary."171
To give an opinion on the nature of a transaction, and
to determine, in particular, whether transferred financial
assets have been isolated and put presumptively beyond the
reach of the transferor and its creditors, could require the
attorney to make a number of judgments: can the transferor
revoke the transfer; into what kind of bankruptcy or other
receivership might a transferor or SPE be placed; would a
transfer of financial assets be likely to be deemed a true
sale in law; and is the transferor affiliated with the
transferee? 172 In Enron's case, the attorney would also be
faced with Enron officers' frequent use of "misleading terms
and jargon in connection with Enron's SPE transactions
[which] appears to have obscured their economic
substance."173
C. Analysis
Project Cornhusker closed on March 27, 1998. In June
1998, the Enron client "relationship partner" at Vinson &
Elkins, Joseph C. Dilg, received a memorandum voicing the
concerns of other Vinson & Elkins attorneys regarding the
Cornhusker true issuance opinions. According to the memo,
[b]ased upon Enron's desire to recognize gain in two separate
quarters, it appears that ... the event that must have resulted in
the recognition of the gain was the transaction between Northern
Plains and NBIL1 (as to which we gave no opinion). Only [that]
part of the transaction ... was structured to 'straddle' the first and
second quarter .... This fact suggests that, for opinion purposes,
we and the accountants focused on the wrong part of the
transaction. 174
A meeting had also been held between Dilg and several
other Vinson & Elkins attorneys involved in the SPE
171. Id. app. C, at 82, n.140 (citing SIR WALTER SCOTT, MARMION, Canto VI,
Stanza 17 (1808) ("Oh what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to
deceive!")).
172. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 27 (citing FAS 125, 23).
173. Id. app. C, at 94.
174. Id. app. C, at 37 (quoting Stephen Tarry).
[Vol. 541092
2007] SOME REALISM ABO UT PROFESSIONALISM 1093
transactions raising concerns should Vinson & Elkins be
asked to give a true sale opinion. 175
In other words, Vinson & Elkins became concerned that
the true issuance opinion might not be responsive to the
intent or purpose for which the true sale opinion is
required. 17 6 Unless a true sale opinion could be rendered on
the transaction prior to the share issuance-that is, the
transfer of a financial asset to NBIL--the requirements of
FAS 125, and its replacement FAS 140, would not be
addressed.
According to one of those present at the meeting,
[t]he purpose of the meeting was to bring to Mr. Dilg's attention
that there were transactions involving true issuance opinions; that
we had this issue of whether or not true issuance opinions were
responsive to FAS-125. We wanted to be sure that he as the Enron
client relationship partner was aware of this. We thought that the
issue should be confirmed at high levels on something like this. 177
Dilg asked about the size and financial impact of these
transactions at the meeting, and at some point, Vinson &
Elkins became aware of the "substantial financial impact"
that these transactions could have on Enron's financial
statements. 178
During the same period, another Vinson & Elkins
attorney held discussions with several partners about
disclosure issues raised by Enron's FAS 140 transactions.
He was concerned that Enron was obtaining an increasing
percentage of its earnings from appreciation of its merchant
assets. One of the concerns he raised was the nature of the
'Total Return Swap' (TRS) part of the transaction: Enron
was not shifting the risk of loss (or, for that matter, the
reward of gain) from assets being transferred. 179 In
addition, Enron's obligation under the TRS to pay the loan
raised liquidity issues. This attorney also estimated that
175. See id.
176. See id. app. C, at 30 n.80 (Vinson & Elkins memorandum).
177. Id. app. C, at 38 (quoting from David Keyes' sworn statement)
(emphasis added).
178. See id. app. C, at 32.
179. "Using a TRS rather than a guarantee was one of Enron's favorite
techniques to avoid disclosure." Final Report, supra note 72, at 97.
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the impact of these transactions on Enron's financial
statements was "significant,"'18 0 and that at least one senior
officer at Enron knew about this. 181
Thus, there were two main concerns. First, unless a
true sale opinion could be given (in regard to the
contribution of the financial assets to NBIL), a true
issuance by NBIL would accomplish little in regard to the
isolation of its financial assets from the original
transferor. 8 2 Secondly, and as a corollary to this, the two
separate transfers must "each qualify as sales" under FAS
140, otherwise NBIL could not sell something which it did
not own. 183
Whether or not the treatments were permitted under
accounting rules, there was also the issue of proper
disclosure in Enron's "Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations"
(MD&A).'84 Enron's MD&A appeared in Enron's Forms 10-
K and 10-Q filed with the SEC. What action did Vinson &
Elkins take to reflect its concerns?
D. Action
One response was to add to its true issuance opinion an
assumption: that a court would not recharacterize the
entire transaction, when viewed in its entirety, as a loan. 8 5
180. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 41 (quoting Scott Wulfe of
Vinson & Elkins).
181. See id. app. C, at 42.
182. See id. app. C, at 31 n.81 (analysis of Kimberly Scardino, an Andersen
accountant).
183. See id. (emphasis added).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2004). In the Management's discussion and
analysis of financial condition and results of operations (MD&A), companies
provide a description of their operations and any initiatives during the relevant
year. The aim should be to give investors an opportunity to look at the company
through the eyes of management by providing both a short and long-term
analysis of the business of the company. See http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-
6835.htm (last visited Oct. 21 2006).
185. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 34-35. Specifically, the
Cornhusker opinion letter contained the assumptions that a court would not
(i) recharacterize the issuance of the Class B Membership Interest by
NBIL . . .as a loan to NBIL supported by a security interest in [its]
Class B Membership Interest, or (ii) recharacterize the [t]ransactions
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The firm did this to "put people on notice" that they were
"not giving a true sale opinion."'18 6  Such a
recharacterization would not be acceptable in a true sale
opinion-it would be assuming away the very issue that a
true sale opinion purported to address: whether the
transaction was really a sale or a loan.
In the Cornhusker opinion, Vinson & Elkins also
referred to the TRS element of the transaction: it "is
basically to make the Lenders whole in the event NBIL2 is
unable to repay principal, interest, fees and other amounts
owed to the Lenders .... The Total Return Swap is similar
in function to a guaranty . "17 Vinson & Elkins did the
same thing on other FAS 140 Transactions, such as Project
Churchill. 88 It specifically opined that, in the event of a
bankruptcy of NBIL, Enron, Northern Plains, or any other
consolidated subsidiary of Enron, the Bankruptcy Court
could conclude that the Class B Membership Interest would
not be the property of these entities. 8 9
Vinson & Elkins' attorneys also contacted both Enron
and Andersen directly to question whether Andersen fully
understood that no true sale opinion was being given. 90
They had repeatedly told Enron and Andersen that
Andersen had asked for the wrong opinion when it
requested its true issuance opinions. 19' One attorney put it
like this: "[F]rom a lawyer's perspective, he [Keyes, a
different Vinson & Elkins attorney] didn't think what they
[Andersen] were asking for was what his reading of the
corporate rules required."' 92  "Andersen apparently
as a loan to Northern Plains supported by a security interest in the
[financial assets].
Id. app. C, at 35 n.99.
186. Id. app. C, at 35 (from David Keyes' sworn statement).
187. Id. app. C, at 33-34 n.93; see also id. at 36 n.106.
188. See id. app. C, at 36 n.106.
189. See id. app. C, at 35 n.105.
190. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. B, at 91.
191. See id. app. C, at 31.
192. Id. app. C, at 34 n.98 (referring to Ronald T. Astin of Vinson & Elkins,
who is referring to David Keyes).
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acknowledged that it was aware that no such opinion was
being given."193
All these matters-the opinion letters and the
disclosure issues-came to a head with a meeting in June
1998 between Joseph C. Dilg, Vinson & Elkins' Enron
relationship partner, and James V. Derrick, Enron's
General Counsel. Prior to the meeting, Dilg was briefed on
the issues. 94 He was concerned that the SPE "transactions
which were generating income were different than receiving
fees from pushing gas through a pipeline or other types of
things."'195 In other words, these were not fees resulting
from normal operating activities.
Dilg understood that his partners had two concerns on
the opinion letters. The first was whether a true issuance
opinion was sufficient for the accounting purposes of the
transaction. The second concern revolved around the need
to clarify and focus Enron on the qualification in the
opinion that the overall transaction would not be
recharacterized as a loan. Dilg also testified that he wanted
Derrick to be aware that it might cost the company a "fair
amount of money to restructure transactions to satisfy us"
should Vinson & Elkins be asked to render a different
opinion which it could not do professionally without such
restructuring. 96
E. Deference and the Division of Professional Labor
It appears that Vinson & Elkins deferred to the
expertise and sophistication of Andersen, of Enron, and of
Enron's in-house counsel. There was a division of
professional labor. Indeed, one Vinson & Elkins attorney
would later testify that the decision to give true issuance
opinions ultimately was based on numerous assurances
given by Andersen (and Enron) that these were what was
required:
[I]n cases where we issue a true issuance opinion, that's the
opinion that we were asked for . . . I mean they were the
193. Id. app. B, at 91.
194. See id. app. C, at 37-43.
195. Id. app. C, at 49.
196. Id. app. C, at 44 n.155.
1096 [Vol. 54
2007] SOME REALISM ABO UT PROFESSIONALISM 1097
accountants, they understood what they wanted and based on
what she [Debra Cash, Andersen] said, I had . . . no reason to
think that was not reasonable from an accounting criteria
standpoint. They were the accountants there.
197
Sometime after the June 1998 meeting, Derrick told
Dilg that he had visited with Enron's Chief Accounting
Officer, who had "checked with the higher-ups within
Arthur Andersen. I [Dilg] took it to be their technical
people, and that they had focused on the opinions and they
knew what they were and that they felt the opinions were
satisfactory for their purposes." 198 For Dilg, that was "the
end of the matter."199 He no longer had any doubts in his
mind; the assurances from both Enron and Andersen were
sufficient. Dilg told the Vinson & Elkins attorney that they
"understood the nature"200 of Vinson & Elkins' opinions.
Further projects and transactions were undertaken and
closed.201 "Both Andersen and Enron continued to ask only
for true issuance, not true sale, opinions up until mid-
2001."202 Thus, Vinson & Elkins delivered the opinions,
sometimes despite "misgivings, but based on Andersen's
assurances" that all that was required was a "true issuance
opinion" for FAS 140 Transactions. 203
Andersen, of course, was one of the "Big 5" accounting
firms, one of the world's biggest. Enron's General Counsel, a
former Vinson & Elkins partner, considered his in-house
legal department to be a "world-class" in-house law firm. 20 4
It consisted of approximately 250 attorneys, 20 5 most of
whom had between eight and seventeen years of legal
experience when they joined Enron. 206 Each of Enron's
business units had its own legal department supervised by
197. Id. app. C, at 33 n.92.
198. Id. app. C, at 46 (quoting Joseph C. Dilg).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. app. C, at 46-47.
202. Id. app. B, at 91.
203. Id. app. C, at 33.
204. See id. app. C, at 16.
205. Id. app. C, at 15.
206. Id. app. C, at 16.
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a general counsel. Each general counsel reported to the
head of the business unit as well as to Enron's General
Counsel. 207 There were weekly meetings of the major
business units' general counsel and monthly conferences
which included the general counsel of overseas entities. 208
These meetings provided, among other things, a forum for
attorneys to raise issues and concerns. 209
Moreover, the Enron Board of Directors itself was
hardly "lightweight"; "by all appearances, Enron's board
looked great .... The directors reflected a wide range of
business, finance, accounting, and government
experience." 210 Kenneth Lay had a Ph.D. in economics;
Jeffrey Skilling graduated with an MBA from Harvard
where he was in the top five percent of his class. The
outside directors of the Board included "a group of men and
women who were highly successful in their professional
careers,"211 including four with Ph.D.s, one with an
honorary doctorate, two medical doctors who each served as
president of one of the world's leading cancer treatment
centers, two law school graduates, twelve had served as
chief executive officers, a Dean of Stanford University
School of Business, a member of the House of Lords in the
United Kingdom who had served under then Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher, and a former Chair of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 21 2  Enron's
General Counsel, James Derrick, apparently "had a lot of
confidence ... in senior management. ' 21 3
Vinson & Elkins deferred to in-house counsel and to
Enron when it expressed concerns about other matters too.
One example was its concern about the legal issues raised
207. See id. app. C, at 17.
208. See id. app. C, at 18.
209. See id.
210. Troy H. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIAsCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 495, 504.
211. Final Report, supra note 72, at 56-57.
212. See id. at 57.
213. Id. app. C, at 130 n.571.
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by the involvement of Michael Kopper in Chewco.214 Vinson
& Elkins advised Enron that investment by an "executive
officer"-such as Andrew Fastow-would have to be
disclosed in Enron's public filings. When Vinson & Elkins
was presented with a proposed structure that placed
Kopper as manager and owner of Chewco, Enron did not
deem Kopper to be an "executive officer" as defined by SEC
rules. 215 When a Vinson & Elkins attorney discussed the
issue with Enron's in-house attorneys, he was told that all
the necessary action "would be handled by in-house
counsel."216
Similarly, Vinson & Elkins had concerns regarding the
Raptor 1 and its "distribution feature" that was critical to
the maintenance of LJM2's three percent equity position-
and its remaining at risk throughout the life of the
structure and therefore off Enron's balance sheet. Those
concerns were deflected because it was seen as an
accounting issue. Vinson & Elkins "received confirmation
from Enron that the accounting was appropriate. '21 7
Checking and making sure that "everybody's comfortable
with the accounting and then . . . it doesn't sound like a
legal issue."218
214. Chewco was formed by Enron in late 1997 to acquire the California
Public Employee Retirement System's (CalPERS) 50% limited partnership
interest in JEDI. JEDI had been created in 1993 to make energy investments.
Enron was the other 50% partner and did not want to purchase CalPERS'
interest directly because that would require JEDI to be consolidated on Enron's
financial statements. Kopper, at the time a vice president in Enron's Global
Capital department, was made the managing partner of Chewco. His
involvement raised conflict of interest questions under Enron's Code of Conduct,
which provided that, in such circumstances, his involvement should be only
with the approval of the Board. The Board was never presented with Kopper's
role in Chewco. Rather, Chewco was characterized by Fastow as an
"unaffiliated" entity to the Enron Board. An additional issue that proved critical
to the Chewco transaction was the requirement that outside investors supply
3% of the equity at risk. It was a violation of this requirement which, when
discovered by Andersen in November 2001, led to the consolidation of Chewco
and JEDI and the restatement of Enron's accounts for the period 1997 through
2001. Id. app C, at 108-10. More details regarding the Chewco transaction can
be found in the lengthy judgment of the court in In re Enron Corp. Secs., 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 613-73 (S.D. Tex., 2002).
215. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 112.
216. Id. app. C, at 113.
217. Id. app. C, at 163-64 n.744,
218. Id. app. C, at 141.
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The approach taken by Vinson & Elkins in deferring to
Andersen is further illustrated by its investigation of the
Watkins "whistleblower" letter.219  The letter raised
accounting issues, but another issue raised was whether to
bring in an outside auditor. The conclusion was not to
retain one. Part of the reason for this may have been the
"attendant focus of the media on Enron, [which] would be
'fairly drastic.'' 220 But it was also determined that Vinson &
Elkins would not "second guess" Andersen or "dig down"
into the transactions. 221 Rather, Vinson & Elkins wanted to
make sure that Andersen "had the proper facts, that they
had all of the facts that they needed to make the review,
and that they were comfortable with their accounting
decisions. But we were not in a position to second-guess
Arthur Andersen's ultimate professional judgment or the
accounting issues involved."222
The Vinson & Elkins investigation therefore was
limited to determining whether there were any facts about
the various structures "that Enron management or
Andersen did not have that might warrant further
investigation of the matters. ' 223 Vinson & Elkins did not
seek to "re-build the disclosure process. ' 224 In any case,
when Vinson & Elkins interviewed Andersen partners to
discuss Watkins' letter, the partners explained that "the
accounting analysis conducted in each of the transactions..
; was complex and aggressive." 225 However, they were
"comfortable with the accounting on Raptors ' '226 and
219. Memorandum from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay (Aug. 15, 2001),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02142002Hearing
489/tabl0.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). See generally Leslie Griffin,
Whistleblowing in the Business World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIAScOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 209; Memorandum from Sherron Watkins to
Kenneth Lay (Aug. 22, 2001), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
107/hearings/02142002Hearing489/tabll.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
220. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 165 (according to Max
Hendrick's sworn statement on July 8, 2003).
221. Id.
222. Id. app. C, at 165 n.754 (quoting Dilg's testimony before Congress)
(emphasis added).
223. Id. app. C, at 165-66.
224. Id. app. C, at 166.
225. Id. app. C, at 174.
226. Id. app. C, at 174-75.
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Andersen was "aware of the put option [in LJM] and was
comfortable with it and the fee arrangement. ' 227 Regarding
LJM, the partners stated that "technically" the investment
and the return was proper.228 The accounting treatment
may have looked "facially questionable," but it satisfied the
technical requirements." 229 Similarly, in answer to the
question of whether there was a valid business purpose for
the put, Andersen relied on Enron's representation that a
good business reason existed. 230 No wonder Vinson &
Elkins concluded that "Enron and Andersen acknowledge
that the accounting treatment is aggressive, but no reason
to believe inappropriate from a technical standpoint."231
And, "[n]otwithstanding the bad cosmetics, Enron
representatives uniformly stated that the Condor and
Raptor vehicles were clever, useful vehicles that benefited
Enron."232
A division of professional labor, and deference to the
expertise and authority of others, meant that Vinson &
Elkins attorneys may not have been fully apprised of the
situation. Indeed, it might have meant that no one was.
F. Black Holes
Gaps in knowledge and information affect the exercise
of professional judgment. Enron's in-house business units'
general counsel held meetings weekly or monthly. They
provided a forum for, amongst other things, attorneys to
raise issues and concerns. 23 3 Yet, Enron's in-house
attorneys failed to identify the concerns which the
Examiner identified regarding Enron's SPE transactions at
any of these meetings. 234 In fact, the issue of the true
227. Id. app. C, at 175.
228. Id. app. C, at 175 n.820.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 176.
232. Id. app. C, at 177.
233. Id. app. C, at 18.
234. Id.
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issuance opinions may have been raised by Vinson & Elkins
with one of Enron's in-house attorneys. 23 5
Not all attorneys are experienced, and some may never
be experienced enough. Two lawyers involved in one of the
structures probably had insufficient experience with such
transaction structures to appreciate the significance of a
"side letter" which established a reserve account that
violated a three percent equity requirement (to avoid
consolidation). 236 Even Joseph C. Dilg, aware of Vinson &
Elkins' concerns about income generated by what did not
appear to be normal operating activities, found it difficult to
challenge once assurances had been made. As Dilg put it,
he did not "think we knew enough about the overall
business to tell them how they ought to write it."237
Indeed, in Enron's case, it is not clear that even the
Board knew enough about the business either. Vinson &
Elkins' "reporting-up" its concerns to the Board might not
have made much difference. First, it appears that the SPE
transactions were structured so that Board approval was
not needed and Enron Board policies, such as those on Risk
Management, Guaranty, and asset divestiture, were not
breached. 238 Furthermore, "particularly in circumstances
involving complex matters and obfuscation by officers of a
company, there are limitations to a board serving as an
effective check in the area of oversight. 23 9
The outside directors at Enron in particular were not
involved in and did not have intimate knowledge of the day-
to-day operations and may not have recognized the "red
flags" regarding the SPE transactions as indicators of
wrongful conduct. 240 Several factors may have contributed
to this: Enron officers' use of misleading terms and
confusing jargon; the presentation of information in a
manner that obfuscated the substance of those
transactions; the length of meetings and the number of
235. Id. app. C, at 34.
236. Id. app. C, at 114 (referring to the JEDI structure).
237. Id. app. C, at 49.
238. Final Report, supra note 72, at 121-24.
239. Id. at 119-20.
240. Id. at 58-59.
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agenda items; and the size of the Board (unusually large,
diminishing the feeling of personal responsibility).241
It is not only gaps in information which can undermine
judgments. The outside directors in fact were provided with
"voluminous information,"242 but not all this information
was helpful. Sometimes there was so much information
provided to the Finance Committee that it was, according to
one former Enron director, "numbing rather than
elucidating."243 "[T]he outside directors did not understand
important aspects about Enron's use of SPE
transactions. "244
Regarding the MD&A, 10-K, and 10-Q filings, although
Vinson & Elkins' attorneys were consulted by Enron's in-
house attorneys on disclosure matters, it was only on an
"episodic" basis; 245  they saw some but not all. 246
241. "The independence and objectivity of the Enron Board may have been
weakened by financial ties . . . which affected a majority of the outside Board
members .... " Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Gov't
Affairs, The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's Collapse, S. Rep. No. 107-
70, at 54 (2002).
242. Final Report, supra note 72, at 59.
243. Id. at 127 (quoting Robert A. Belfer).
244. Id. at 132. The Examiner did conclude there was evidence that they
were in possession of facts regarding the LJMI/Rhythms Hedging Transaction
and certain of the LJM2/Raptors Hedging Transactions necessary to conclude
neither of them had a rational business purpose and that they acted in bad
faith and in breach of their fiduciary duty of good faith in authorizing and
approving the transactions. Id. at 59, 61. In these transactions, Enron
transferred substantial value for non-economic hedges, meaning the value of
each hedge to Enron was based solely on the value of the securities and cash
that Enron itself had transferred to the hedging vehicles, providing Enron with
no economic value but only a financial statement benefit, and that they acted in
bad faith and in breach of their fiduciary duty of good faith in authorizing and
approving the transactions. Id. at 59, 61. On Jan. 7, 2005, it was announced
that ten former outside directors of Enron had agreed personally to contribute
$13 million to a $168 million settlement (apparently reached in Oct. 2004, but
kept confidential). The contribution reported equals ten percent of their pre-tax
profit from Enron stock sales. These directors were not alleged to have been
active participants in any underlying fraud. Further, a court had previously
dismissed claims against them for alleged insider dealing. See
http://www.friedfrank.com/cmemos/050113_worldcom%20enron.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2006).
245. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 84.
246. Id. app. C, at 168 n.771 (citing sworn statement of Joseph C. Dilg,
referring to Ronald T. Astin).
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Furthermore, they were probably not told of Enron's
expectations about the scope of their involvement in
Enron's public disclosures. 247 Enron's in-house counsel's
expectations for Vinson & Elkins' review of SEC filings
"was very general ... there was no specific instructions [sic]
other than review and give us your comments."248 The input
of various Vinson & Elkins' attorneys working on the
various SPE transactions was not solicited. 249 In any case,
where specific transactions were discussed in a filing, not
necessarily the entire document, but parts only, were sent
by in-house attorneys or other groups in Enron to the
Vinson & Elkins attorney who worked on that transaction
for that attorney's review. 250 Moreover, as the attorney told
Dilg, even when they did see the 10-Ks and 10-Qs, "since
they were part of the overall financial statements, we had
very limited ability to comment, et cetera."25 1
Enron knew, or should have known, that Vinson &
Elkins was not devoting significant time to its review of
SEC filings and that it was not, contrary to what Derrick
testified was his impression, "fully involved in ensuring
that Enron's public disclosures were adequate. '252 Vinson &
Elkins typically received Enron's financial statements two
to three days before filing, so they had "very limited
opportunities to comment on them. '253 Vinson & Elkins
invoices confirmed all of this.254
However, as a result of interaction with Vinson &
Elkins, Enron did add new language to its public disclosure.
"[N]either the new language nor other information .
adequately informed shareholders or creditors of the
elements of these transactions that Vinson & Elkins had
247. Id. app. C, at 85.
248. Id. app. C, at 86 (quoting the sworn statement of Rex Rogers, Vice
President and Associate General Counsel, Enron).
249. See id. (citing the sworn statement of Rogers).
250. Id. (citing the sworn statement of Rogers).
251. Id. app. C, at 168 n.771 (quoting the sworn statement of Joseph C. Dilg,
referring to Ronald T. Astin).
252. Id. app. C, at 84.
253. Id. app. C, at 172 (citing to the sworn statements of Hendrick and
Dilg). Note that Vinson & Elkins' involvement in proxy statements was "more
involved." Id. (citing to the sworn testimony of Joseph Dilg).
254. See id. app. C, at 87.
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recognized and brought to Enron's attention."255 However, it
was Vinson & Elkins that had brought it to their attention.
It had not been passive about the matter and it did respond
to the challenge.
Indeed, where Vinson & Elkins did raise disclosure
points about certain SPE transactions and felt that
disclosure was mandatory, the Examiner found no evidence
that Enron ever refused to make such a disclosure.
Moreover, as we have seen, Vinson & Elkins, contrary to
what was believed prior to the Examiner's Final Report, 256
did not, with the single exception of Project Sundance
Industrial, issue true sale opinions. Indeed, it had expressly
refused to do so, for example, when Enron requested it do so
in Raptor 111.257
As the firm saw it, it issued "non substantive
consolidation opinions,"258  together with "no
recharacterization" assumptions ("to put people on
notice"259). The "problem" was however, as one Vinson &
Elkins attorney put it, that "most disclosure questions are
judgmental in nature and it's rare that one is a completely
open and shut situation."260
G. (Dis)Honest Differences of Opinion
There can be honest-as well as dishonest-differences
of opinion about the nature of transactions and the
application of regulatory requirements. Vinson & Elkins
had to exercise judgment on disclosure questions in
partnership with others. Where it made disclosure
recommendations to Enron rather than mandatory
255. Id. app. C, at 32.
256. See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in
Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1110 (2003). The error may
have come from the Watkins whistleblower letter which urged that Vinson &
Elkins should not be retained to undertake an investigation of her allegations
"because it had rendered true sale opinions." Final Report, supra note 72, app.
C, at 161 n.724).
257. See Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 162 n.735 (citing to sworn
statement of Mark Spradling).
258. Id. app. C, at 162 (quoting the sworn statement of Astin).
259. See id. app. C, at 35 (quoting the sworn statement of David Keyes).
260. Id. app. C, at 87 n.339 (quoting the sworn statement of Astin).
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requirements, there was little it could do when Enron
decided not to make so full a disclosure.
Acknowledgment that there may be honest differences
forces us to re-appraise what it means to exercise
independent professional judgment. The legal standard of
care applicable to attorneys is that of the "reasonably
prudent attorney. ' 26 1 So, if there is "more than one possible
decision or course of conduct available to an attorney of
reasonable prudence," there should be no liability. The
standard allows "some latitude in making strategic and
tactical decisions. 26 2
That there is more than one way of looking at it is
confirmed already, somewhat ironically, by the opinion
shopping Vinson & Elkins undertook. It obtained the
opinions of "law school professors and practitioners on
several matters as to which the Examiner took
testimony."263
Independent professional judgment does not mean
consensus. Vinson & Elkins understood, erroneously, that
Andrews & Kurth was issuing true sales opinions after it
had taken over most of the FAS 140 Transactions in late
1998.264 Although it was concerned about the credibility of
those opinions, it did not raise it with Enron, concluding
"that the issue with the Andrews & Kurth true sale
opinions were a matter of professional judgment."265 Vinson
& Elkins concluded that this was a "matter of professional
disagreement and that Vinson & Elkins could not say that
an attorney acting within the standard of care would not
give the opinions." 266 In other words, there was not
261. See id. app. C, annex. 1, at 8.
262. See id.
263. Final Report, supra note 72, at 14 n.26.
264. See id. app. C, at 171. Between 1998 and 2001, Enron closed more than
thirty FAS 140 Transactions; Andrews & Kurth represented Enron in twenty-
eight of them. Andrews & Kurth issued twenty-four opinions after late 1998;
only one was a true sale opinion (the same number as Vinson & Elkins). Id.
app. C, at 53 n.181.
265. See id. app. C, at 171 n.795 (citing the sworn statement of Astin).
266. Id. app. C, at 89 (citing the sworn statement of Astin).
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something "so fatally wrong with the opinion that we didn't
think a reasonable lawyer could give it. ' '267
There is no evidence that Enron transferred its opinion
business to Andrews & Kurth as a form of opinion
shopping, though some have suspected it.268 However,
Andrews & Kurth were less questioning of Enron. Unlike
Vinson & Elkins, it did not raise with Enron or Andersen
whether or not a true issuance opinion was responsive to
the requirements of FAS 140. What is particularly
significant, however, is that despite common misperception,
according to the Examiner, neither Vinson & Elkins nor
Andrews & Kurth, with one exception, provided true sale
opinions.
It was not until another project, Iguana, in late 1999,
that Andersen "appears to have understood the import of
the true issuance/true sale distinction and the 'no
recharacterization' assumption contained in Vinson &
Elkins' true issuance opinion letters. '' 269 A meeting between
Vinson & Elkins and Andersen was held where the legal
opinion was discussed. Apparently, Enron's in-house
attorneys were not happy, as one Vinson & Elkins attorney
noted in an e-mail:
I think I am blamed by some of the inside Enron attorneys,... for
drawing this distinction to AA's attention, as it could jeopardize
Enron's FAS 125 transactions. The Enron theory is, apparently,
that relations with AA must be carefully managed and that AA is
a sophisticated organization that can read opinions and draw their
own conclusion. I have believed that it is our professional duty to
call the attention of a third party recipient to the meaning and
scope of our opinion, especially in a situation where we do not
believe that the recipient has a correct understanding of what it
says in relation to the purpose for which the opinion is
requested.270
267. Id. (quoting the sworn statement of Astin).
268. Gordon, supra note 21, at 771 ("If one firm balked at approving a deal,
as [Vinson & Elkins] occasionally did, Enron managers would go across town to
another, more compliant firm, such as Andrews & Kurth."). Andrews & Kurth
provided only a single true sale opinion (and twenty-three true issuance
opinions).
269. Final Report, supra note 72, at 47.
270. Id. app. C, at 47 n.169 (quoting the sworn statement of David Keyes,
Vinson & Elkins) (emphasis added).
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Later, however, referring to his e-mail, this attorney
testified that this was not an accurate statement of the
firm's professional duty. He stated, "I don't think that's a
correct statement of legal opinion practice and I-I'm
reasonably confident that what I meant by that was that I
shouldn't affirmatively mislead somebody .... -271 As we
have seen, Enron's FAS 140 Transactions were structured
finance transactions that "were intended to comply" with
either FAS 125 or its successor, FAS 140.272 The accounting
on the transactions was "creative" and "aggressive.'"273
Crucial to the accounting treatment was the matter of the
"isolation" of financial risks and rewards from the reporting
company. The isolation criteria, however, were a "matter of
law, '274 a legal assessment, 275 hence the need for an opinion
letter. Compliance, however, can take several forms.
H. Technical Compliance
In the Cornhusker transaction, a true issuance opinion
was given despite Vinson & Elkins' attorneys' concerns over
the opinion. An internal Vinson & Elkins memorandum
identified the concerns:
Although the true issuance opinion is rendered at the step
following the transfer of financial assets into the issuer, we believe
that rendering a true issuance opinion based exclusively on the
relevant state statute concerning issuances of ownership interests, while
technically correct, may not be responsive to the intent or purpose for
which the true sale opinion is required. In light of this position, while
we may continue to render true issuance opinions in transactions
that are modeled on earlier true issuance transactions, we believe
it may be better to render true sale opinions at the step preceding
the issuance, rather than true issuance opinions, for the following
reasons: Such opinion is more responsive to the requirements of
FAS 125 and its replacement, FAS 140 .... 276
271. Id. app. C, at 47 n.169 (emphasis added).
272. Final Report, supra note 72, at 18 n.38.
273. Id. app. C, at 177-78 (citing to letter dated Oct. 15, 2001 from Max
Hendrick III to James V. Derrick).
274. Id. app. C, at 27.
275. See id. app. C, at 27-28.
276. Id. app. C, at 30 n.80 (author unknown) (emphasis added).
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The view that the opinion could be technically correct,
despite not responding to regulatory requirements, was
shared by others, critics of Vinson & Elkins and Enron. The
Examiner found that the financial statements produced
failed to disclose the substance of the FAS 140 transactions
but added the words: "regardless of whether the accounting
was technically correct. ' 277  Similarly, Watkins, who
believed, wrongly as it turned out, that Vinson & Elkins
had issued true sale opinions, nevertheless thought that the
accounting was "technically" correct. 278 Given its reluctance
to issue even a true issuance opinion in Project Cornhusker,
how could Vinson & Elkins issue a true sale opinion in
Project Sundance Industrial?
I. True Sale Opinion: Project Sundance Industrial2 79
Project Sundance Industrial (PSI) was the third of four
separate, but related, transactions that involved Enron's
forest products business during late 2000 and 2001. In PSI,
Enron formed Sundance Industrial Partners L.P.
(Sundance) to acquire the forest products business.
Salomon Brothers, a wholly owned subsidiary of Citigroup,
was a limited partner in Sundance.
Salomon was to contribute $28.5 million in initial
equity investment. However, Enron asked Salomon to (i)
contribute $8.5 million in cash to Sundance, (ii) to purchase
for $20 million a 0.01% equity interest in Sonoma I, LLC,
an entity in another of the four transactions, and (iii) to
immediately contribute the Sonoma equity interest to
Sundance. As a result, Enron recorded the $20 million of
income from gain on sale of the interest.
Had the $20 million equity interest in Sonoma been
contributed directly to Sundance (which had been the
"original, and more direct, approach to the transaction"280 )
Enron could not recognize the gain. Enron's purpose in
structuring the two-step process was thus to enable Enron
to recognize the $20 million gain in earnings. Vinson &
277. Final Report, supra note 72, at 21.
278. Id. app. C, at 165.
279. The following description is taken from the Id. app. C, at 72-81.
280. Id. app. C, at 74-75 (citing to the sworn statement of Mark Spradling of
Vinson & Elkins).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Elkins, which represented Enron in PSI, understood that to
be the purpose, 28 ' but still gave a true sale opinion
regarding the Sonoma interest to Salomon. As discussed
further below, the Examiner concluded that there was no
true sale of this interest.
Drawing a distinction between technical correctness
and purpose may help to explain this. The first technically
correct matter was that Sundance contributed equity
sufficient for Enron to treat Sundance as an equity method
investee rather than a consolidated subsidiary for
accounting purposes. However, the question remains as to
why Vinson & Elkins gave a true sale opinion knowing that
Enron's purpose in structuring the two-step process was to
enable Enron to recognize the $20 million gain in
earnings. 252
Vinson & Elkins was not unconcerned with the nature
of the transaction. Salomon would acquire the Sonoma
equity interest and, immediately or shortly following that
sale, contribute it to the capital of Sundance. An immediate
transfer by Salomon to an affiliate of Sonoma was contrary
to at least one essential element of a sale-that the risks
and rewards of the equity interest had shifted from Sonoma
to Salomon. But that was not the only essential element.28 3
According to one Vinson & Elkins attorney,
[w]e emphasize that we believe it is necessary for the transaction
to reflect the assumption by SBHC [Salomon] of real risks and
benefits of ownership of the Sonoma A that survive the transfer of
the Sonoma A interest to Sundance. Any court reviewing the
transaction would examine the substance and reality of the
transaction rather than its mere form in order to assess whether
the characterization chosen by the transaction parties would be
respected-in short, . [sic] We believe the current structure lacks
several elements we believe would be necessary in order for us to
render an opinion that a sale truly occurs under the current
transaction documents described above.
In order for us to render a true sale opinion on this transaction,
each of the following elements must be present:
281. Id. app. C, at 75.
282. See id. app. C, at 75.
283. Id. app. C, at 76.
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The transaction must not be pre-wired (the option given to SBHC
to contribute cash or the Sonoma A must be real).
The transaction must have a commercial purpose for both parties
(other than simply favorable tax or accounting, although favorable
tax and accounting treatment doesn't adversely impact a
transaction with another purpose. [sic]
Any transaction retained by SBHC must continue to possess
aspects of risk and rewards of ownership with regard to the
Sonoma A (that is, SBHC must have some continued ownership
characteristics with regard to the asset it purchased).28 4
Yet, Vinson & Elkins focused only on the technical issue
of how to ensure that the risks and rewards had transferred
to Salomon, something Salomon was very keen to avoid.
Accordingly, Vinson & Elkins had put and call rights added
so that both Sundance and Salomon could force each other
to re-transfer the interest back to Salomon.
These rights were the subject of intensive
negotiation, 28 5 with Vinson & Elkins insisting on them
being "real" and "really exercisable." 28 6 For Vinson &
Elkins, the "puts and calls are what is necessary for us to
give our opinion regarding true sale matters. '28 7 Vinson &
Elkins refused to remove the risk from Salomon "since we
are already at the wall on the opinion. ' 28 8 In the end, in
July 2001, the month after the transaction closed on June 1,
2001, Vinson & Elkins gave the true sale opinion. 28 9
The Examiner was critical of this decision:
[T]he circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the sale at the
last minute, the persistent attempts of Salomon Holding to
extinguish any risk of ownership of the Sonoma Class A
Interest, and the difficulty that Vinson & Elkins had in
negotiating the put and call provision belie that either Salomon
284. Id. app. C, at 75-76, (quoting a memorandum written Astin).
285. Id. app. C, at 77 (quoting the sworn statement of Astin).
286. Id. app. C, at 77 n.291 (quoting the sworn statement of Astin).
287. Id. app. C, at 77 n.289 (quoting an email dated May 29, 2001 from
Astin).
288. Id. app. C, at 77 (quoting an email dated May 29, 2001 from Astin).
289. Id. app. C, at 78 n.297.
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Holding or Enron had any true business purpose in this
transaction. 290
He concluded that "information available to Vinson &
Elkins, including the conduct of the parties, indicates that
the only purpose of the sale of the Sonoma Class A Interest
to Salomon Holding was to permit Enron to recognize the
accounting benefit, a purpose which Astin [a Vinson &
Elkins attorney] understood."29 1
Vinson & Elkins was aware of one of the essential
elements of a true sale: that the transaction must have a
commercial purpose for both parties. This was one of the
factors highlighted in a November 2000 internal Vinson &
Elkins draft document entitled "Selected True Sale and
Non-Consolidation Criteria":
21. Overall Business Purpose. The transferor should be
motivated by bona fide business benefits in consummating the
structured finance transaction ... apart solely or primarily from
achieving a perceived accounting, tax or other "structured" result
for the transaction. Once this test is met, a transferor should be
free to structure the transaction in the most advantageous manner
consistent with applicable law and accounting principles ....
26. Surrounding Facts Consistent with Assumptions. It may
not be reasonable to rely on recitations set out in the documents, if
the statements or conduct of the parties to the transactions are
inconsistent with the recitations.
29 2
What happened in this true sale opinion was that
Vinson & Elkins, despite the conduct of the parties,
Salomon especially, which indicated very clearly a desire to
eliminate any risk of ownership, 293 made an assumption
"that each party, including Salomon Holding, had a valid
business purpose for entering into the transaction."294 This
was spelled out in the Sundance opinion letter, as was the
reliance placed by Vinson & Elkins on officers' certificates
290. Id. app. C, at 81 (emphasis added).
291. Id. Vinson & Elkins attorneys were also criticized for their tax opinions
on similar grounds, that they were aware that various transactions had no
identified business purpose. Id. app. C, at 91-107.
292. Id. app. C, at 80 n.304 (emphasis added).
293. See id. app. C, at 81; see also id. app. C, at 79.
294. Id. app. C, at 81 n.305.
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and representations. 295 Vinson & Elkins made clear that it
had deferred to the representations of the client (or what it
perceived to be the client).
J. Creative Compliance
The true sale opinion in Project Sundance Industrial
was a classic attempt at "creative compliance." 296 Creative
compliance is achieved via several strategies; for example,
advantageous interpretations of grey areas, seeking out
loopholes in specific rules, or dreaming up devices which
regulators had not even thought of, let alone regulated.
Creative compliance allows claims that regulations have
been complied with, while any downside from compliance is
avoided. It relies on a formalist approach whether the form
of law is narrow and specific, or broad and open-ended;
whether the law is expressed as rules or as standards or
principles. The rule can be manipulated; the lack of rule can
be exploited using a formalist critique-the "where does it
say I cannot do that?" approach. Such an approach can in
turn often lead to the production of rules, which can then be
manipulated. 297
In the regulation of accounting, in tax, and in many
other areas, the claim that what has taken place is perfectly
legal is a powerful tool of resistance and a substantial
challenge to regulators; 298 hence the importance, once
again, of the attorney. The provision of true issuance
opinions can be seen as creative compliance, as can other
examples.
295. Id. "We wish to point out that we have not made any investigation or
inquiry of any Party or of the books and records of any Party. Rather, we have
relied on officer's certificates and representations in the Transaction Documents
as to such factual matters as we have deemed appropriate for the purposes of
this opinion."
296. See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the
Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848 (1991).
297. See id. Rules can emerge through guidelines and clearances as well as
case law.
298. See DOREEN McBARNET & CHRISTOPHER WHELAN, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING
AND THE CROSS-EYED JAVELIN THROWER (1999); see also Doreen McBarnet, Syd
Weston & Christopher J. Whelan, Adversary Accounting: Strategic Uses of
Financial Information by Capital and Labour, 18 ACCT. ORG.& SOC 81 (1993).
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K. LJM2
In relation to Fastow's interest in LJM2, Jordan Mintz,
General Counsel to Enron Global Finance, decided "with
assistance from Vinson & Elkins, 299 that Enron did not
have to disclose it in the Proxy Statement filed in 2001.
Enron avoided this by creative compliance with the wording
of the law requiring disclosure, where "practicable" of the
related party's interest. 300 Enron decided that it was not
practicable to quantify it and, in so doing, Mintz "placed
enormous technical reliance on the word 'practicable'
contained in the relevant SEC regulation. '3 01
Vinson & Elkins was involved in that analysis, as a
result of which the Proxy Statement filed one year earlier,
in 2000, specifically mentioned Fastow and that he had a
"promoted interest that grew the more successful LJM2
was. ' 30 2 However, because the transactions had not been
settled or liquidated, it was deemed not practicable to
determine the amount of that distribution.
In 2001, however, attorneys knew that Fastow believed
LJM would be closed down if his supervisors knew the
amount he had received from LJM entities.3 03 It turns out
he received at least $18 million in distributions and $2.6
million in management fees, a portion of which was
received during 2000.304 Thus, the Statement in 2001 raised
more difficult issues for Vinson & Elkins. The starting point
was that Enron would have to disclose the compensation
Fastow earned from his position in LJM.305 Fastow wished
to avoid this. A meeting was then arranged between in-
house and Vinson & Elkins' attorneys in January 2001. The
agenda, arguably, was creative compliance: "the number
one item on our list is to resolve the 'where practicable'
language .... We need to be 'creative' on this point within
299. Final Report, supra note 72, at 98.
300. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2006).
301. Final Report, supra note 72, at 98 n.183.
302. Id. app. C, at 149-50 (quoting sworn statement of Astin).
303. Id. app. C, at 151.
304. Id. app. C, at 153-54 n.689.
305. Id. app. C, at 150 (e-mail from Jordan Mintz, Enron, to Rex Rogers,
Enron, Nov. 28, 2000).
1114 [Vol. 54
2007] SOME REALISM ABOUT PROFESSIONALISM 1115
the contours of Item 404306 so as to avoid any type of stark
disclosure, if at all possible."307
The view of the Vinson & Elkins attorney was that
Fastow's "interest wasn't choate or determinable and,
therefore, was not to be disclosed under the securities
laws." 308 The amounts Fastow received were subject to
"clawback" provisions and therefore not "practically
determinable. 309
This conclusion was not arrived at lightly. The attorney
was asked: "Is this one of those things that's technically the
law, but not the spirit of [the] law?" He replied, "No. This is
the spirit of the law and technically the law. '310 There is no
stronger claim to be "perfectly legal," but is it actually an
accolade to creative compliance?311 Subsequently, he billed
over eight hours on the issue prior to the Proxy Statement
being filed on March 27, 2001. The Statement recorded
Fastow's involvement in LJM2, and his entitlement to
receive a percentage of the profits of LJM2, depending upon
the performance of its investments. 31 2
While an in-house attorney described the level of
disclosure as a "close call," 31 3 the Vinson & Elkins attorney
306. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2006).
307. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 151 (e-mail from Mintz to
Rogers & Ronald T. Astin, Vinson & Elkins, Jan. 16, 2001, and forwarded to
Rob Walls, Deputy General Counsel Enron & James Derrick, General Counsel
Enron, the same day).
308. Id. app. C, at 152 n.678 (quoting sworn statement of Walls).
309. Id. app. C, at 155 (quoting sworn statement of Astin).
310. Id. app. C, at 152 n.678 (quoting sworn statement of Walls, referring to
Astin's answer to Wall's question).
311. Another example of creative compliance involved the role played by
Kopper in the Chewco and LJM transactions respectively. Enron's in-house
attorneys decided that Enron did not have to disclose Kopper's involvement as
the general partner of Chewco because, although he was a vice president, he
was not an "executive officer" of Enron, as defined under applicable SEC rules.
Final Report, supra note 72, at 98. In relation to LJM, a "where does it say I
can't do that?" approach was adopted. Kopper had resigned as an Enron
employee so that he could buy Fastow's interest in _JM and LJM2 in 2001. As a
former employee of Enron the approach was, "[i]f [it is] not absolutely required"
do not do it so that the transformation of IMM to a "true third-party would seem
to be more complete if we exclude the phrase." Id. at 98-99.
312. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 155 n.696.
313. Id. app. C, at 157 (quoting the sworn statement by Astin).
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confirmed his comfort with it.314 Shortly after this, the in-
house attorney unilaterally sought further advice regarding
several issues relating to LJM from another outside law
firm, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.315
There was a difference of opinion. Fried Frank concluded
that the prior disclosures were "incomplete";31 6 that issues
remained relating to the existing structures and prior
transactions that "warranted review and possibly fuller
disclosure";317 and that the conclusion-that the interest
need not be disclosed because the transactions had not been
settled and therefore disclosure was not "practicable-to be
too aggressive. '318
The Enron case study suggests that none of the
ideologies of legal practice satisfactorily explains Vinson &
Elkins' relationship with Enron. This is not to say that
professional ideals, libertarian ideologies, or commercial
realities played no part. Elements of all three-and
tensions between them-can be found. However, the case
study may go some way to de-mystifying them in the
context of large firm practice. It suggests a new way of
conceptualizing core values in that context with
implications for professional and other lawyer regulation.
III. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING CORE VALUES
After Enron, critics, reformers, and regulators have all
called for large firm corporate transaction lawyers to be
more professional, to re-focus their moral compass, and, in
terms of core values, to exercise more independent
professional judgment and to show greater respect for the
rule of law. Some have recommended that they perform
specific public roles such as gatekeeper, watchdog, or
314. Id.
315. Id. app. C, at 127 n.547.
316. Id. app. C, at 157 (quoting the sworn statement of James H. Schropp of
Fried Frank).
317. Id. app. C, at 158 (quoting the sworn statement of Schropp of Fried
Frank).
318. Id.
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whistleblower. 319 Ultimately, they should be prepared to
withdraw quietly or, perhaps, noisily.
An extensive literature has developed on the role of the
lawyer as "gatekeeper," sometimes referred to as
"watchdog."3 20 The former term was first used to describe
the role of professionals in capital markets. 32 1 It refers
broadly to professionals playing the role of "unbiased
intermediaries between issuers and regulators, and to
prevent corporate misconduct."322 Gatekeepers, it is said,
lend their professional reputation to transactions and "the
market recognizes that the gatekeeper has a lesser
incentive to lie than does its client." 323  Thus, the
gatekeeper's assurance or evaluation is more "credible."324
Although some have advocated that lawyers should act
as gatekeepers in some contexts, 325 others have questioned
319. There have been similar calls regarding in-house counsel. Sung Hui
Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2005). There are exceptions. In the wake of Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley and European accounting scandals, the European Union has
proposed a new law to regulate the EU audit professions. According to one
commentator, "Europe's response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been a craven
submission to an American obsession with regulating ethics." Carl Mortished,
There Is Nothing New Under the Sun, Particularly in Accountancy, THE TIMES
(London), May 12, 2004, at Business 26.
320. In the watchdog role, the professional assumes, in Chief Justice
Burger's view, a "public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client." This role assumes "total independence from the
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust." United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). See generally Peter
C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in
Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213 (2000).
321. The term is attributed to Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). For a
comprehensive review, see Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735 (2004).
322. Bonnie Fish, Pointing the Finger at Professionals: The Responsibility of
Lawyers and Other Gatekeepers for Corporate Governance Failures, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 97-
98 (Poonam Puri & Jeffrey Larsen eds., 2004).
323. John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 Bus. LAw. 1403, 1405 (2002).
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Kostant, supra note 320; Wilkins, supra note 23; David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992)
(securities lawyers are in the best position to ensure fidelity to the law); Fred
Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387 (2004).
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it.326 According to John C. Coffee, Jr., "[p]roperly
understood, Enron is a demonstration of gatekeeper failure,
and the question it most sharply poses is how this failure
should be rectified. ' 327 He argues that boards of directors
became "prisoners" of their professional gatekeepers.328
Sarbanes-Oxley now provides an "invigorated role for
lawyers as gatekeepers" 329 and is based on the "model of
attorney as gatekeeper, with the premise that forcing
attorneys to provide more information to corporate
decisionmakers will improve the resulting quality of
corporate decisions." 33 0 Coffee argues that only if the
board's agents properly advise and warn can the board
function effectively. 331
Others have advocated that the lawyer's role be
extended, in appropriate circumstances, to include
whistleblowing.3 2 While a gatekeeper would withdraw
their services in certain circumstances, a whistleblower
would go further and explain why they did so. The SEC,
under Sarbanes-Oxley, proposed a whistleblowing-or
"noisy withdrawal"-rule. Under section 205.3(d), an
attorney would not only withdraw, but notify the SEC in
writing of their withdrawal in cases where the issuer's
officers and directors failed to respond appropriately to
violations that threatened substantial injury to the issuer
or investors. Alternatively, the issuer itself would be
required to disclose its counsel's withdrawal as a material
326. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 322, at 126; see also id. at 111-17 (explaining
"Why Lawyers Make Lousy Gatekeepers").
327. Coffee, supra note 323, at 1405; see also William W. Bratton, Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL.
L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2003) ("In our self-regulatory system of corporate law, the
job of insisting on trustworthy numbers devolves in the first instance on the
gatekeepers."); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper. An Agenda for
the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003).
328. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006).
329. Fisch & Rosen, supra note 256, at 1099.
330. Id. at 1101.
331. Coffee, supra note 328.
332. See Griffin, supra note 219; Kostant, supra note 320; Richard W.
Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1995).
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event.3 33 The ABA opposed this proposal on the ground that
it would drive a wedge into the attorney-client
relationship. 334
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, reporting "up the ladder" of a
material violation of law, or breach of fiduciary duty, is
required. Unless the issuer has established a Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee, the attorney must report to
the Chief Legal Officer (CLO) of the issuer, or both the CLO
and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the issuer. The
rule requires the attorney to evaluate the appropriateness
of the response and to report the matter to the audit
committee, another committee of independent directors, or
to the full board of directors if the reporting attorney does
not reasonably believe that the CLO or CEO has provided
an appropriate response within a reasonable time. The rule
is also clear that a reporting attorney may not rely
completely on the assurance of the CLO that no violation
has occurred or that the issuer is undertaking an
appropriate response. 335 Deference is not a defense. No
longer should they be able to deny responsibility for
accounting fraud just because they are not accountants,
hence the recommendation that corporate lawyers, in order
to fulfill this desired role, should be competent in
accounting. 336
Some have gone further and proposed a new role for
corporate lawyers. Gordon, for example, rejects the
"adversary-advocate" role, which he calls the "bar's
standard construction of the corporate lawyer's role" and
proposes what is, in essence, the functional equivalent of
the traditional English barrister's role. 337 In short, the
333. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (2006).
334. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 53 n.94 (2003).
335. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.); see also Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.
336. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business
Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421 (2002); see also RAPOPORT
& DHARAN, Enron and the Business World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 96 (arguing that "[p]art of the solution
must include a working knowledge of each other's fields."); see also id. at 301.
337. Gordon, supra note 21, at 763. Gordon proposes a "separate
professional role for a distinct type of lawyer, the Independent Counselor, with
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Enron case has been used to support calls for reform in
order to revive the high ideals of lawyering. 338
In hindsight, of course, it is regrettable that Vinson &
Elkins did not take more steps than it did. Attorneys could
have provided a "check and balance against the Enron
officers' wrongdoing."339 They could have apprised Enron's
General Counsel or Board when they "knew of conduct that
could result in Enron disseminating materially misleading
financial information. ' 340 When they were concerned about
the "propriety" of the SPE transactions, they could have
"refused to render legal services. '341
But the case study suggests that there should be some
realism about professionalism. It challenges some of the
assumptions about professional core values and the role
they play in practice. It therefore calls into question most,
and maybe all, of these prescriptions.
A. Independent Professional Judgment
Scholars have noted that the actions of large firm
corporate lawyers are not easily distinguishable from those
of their clients;342 that "[i]ndependence from the client ... is
generally not a legitimate aspiration for the bar."343
Sophisticated, well-advised and economically powerful
clients may well dominate the lawyer-client relationship.
This follows not only from their financial power, but from
their access to non-financial resources-human, and
technical, in-house, and outside. Typically, with corporate
clients, it is corporate management who "defines the
a distinct ethical orientation, institutionalized in a distinct governance regime
of ethical codes, liability and malpractice rules, special statutory duties and
privileges, and judicial rules of practice." Id. at 786.
338. See generally id.
339. Final Report, supra note 72, at 114.
340. Id.
341. Id. Under Texas Rules, withdrawal may be required if there is
knowledge of wrongful conduct, even if approved at the highest level of an
organization. TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 1.12(b).
342. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate
Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1994).
343. Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2003).
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objectives of the representation, identifies the
responsibilities for which the lawyer has been retained and
determines whether the lawyer's performance has been
acceptable."3 44 Add to this a compensation culture which
rewards officers if the company's financial matrices look
good, and client's officers may put pressure on outsiders,
including professional advisers. The result, to say the least,
is that the professional ideal of independent professional
judgment is under threat.
Large clients, like Enron, can manipulate lawyers and
law firms. They have access to many outside law firms and
can pick and choose as they wish. They can use litigation
lawyers rather than transactional lawyers in order to get
the advice they want.345 They can hire and fire at will. It is
unlikely that any single law firm or lawyer has a complete
picture of the client's activities.346 Black holes exist-and
can be made to exist-making it difficult to perform a
gatekeeper or watchdog role. Specialization by lawyers is
routine too. While Gordon says lawyers should ask whether
they can "conscientiously and ethically do their jobs and
exercise their functions as fiduciaries" when "access to the
big picture is prevented," the Enron case study suggests
that this is an unrealistic question in practice. 347 While the
344. Fisch & Rosen, supra note 256, at 1123. Professional regulation makes
clear that the client to whom lawyers owe their duties is the corporation, not
the officers. TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 1.12(a). This distinction is
"sometimes misunderstood by corporate lawyers," HAZARD & HODES supra note
12, at 394, and, it appears, by the courts. See William H. Simon, Whom (Or
What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intra-client
Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2003). In the Enron case, the Examiner wondered if
the attorneys lost sight of the distinction. Final Report, supra note 72, at 115. It
has been argued that the Rule is "extremely narrow" and is "too vague to offer
meaningful guidance for lawyers whose corporate clients have managers that
might be harming the corporation, or acting in a manner that might impute
liability to the corporation." Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing
the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 544-45.
(referring to Model Rule 1.13, upon which the Texas Rule 1.12 is based).
345. See William H. Simon, From the Trenches and Towers: the Kaye Scholer
Affair, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 270-73 (1989).
346. And, of course, lawyer-client confidentiality can be used as a cloak to
protect the client from the full picture ever emerging. This is both a regulatory
challenge and an enforcement challenge.
347. Gordon, supra note 21, at 771.
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"it isn't my job" response to criticism may be "alarming,"348
the "lack of joint ownership of issues" is a fact of large law
firm and corporate life. Wrongdoing, therefore, might be
easily missed, overlooked, or insufficiently evident. Without
sufficient knowledge or information, it is difficult to
challenge the client, particularly when the standard
requires a "business purpose" test. In this context, it is the
client that sets the agenda and controls the objectives; law
firms respond, and do so in the context of a division of
professional labor.
But the case study yields some surprises. While the
combination of a libertarian ideology and rampant
commercialism would lead many to predict unconfined
"partisan zeal,"349 especially since law is not "objective,
consistent and legitimate, '350 this was not the case. Vinson
& Elkins was not simply a "hired gun" for Enron.
There was little or no direct evidence of a particular
attorney's actual knowledge of wrongful conduct by an
Enron officer. Indeed, attorneys denied having such
knowledge.3 51  Such knowledge is necessary for
malpractice 352 and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary
duties liabilities. Although he found circumstantial
evidence from which a fact-finder could infer knowledge, 353
the Examiner also noted some of the counter-arguments
Vinson & Elkins could employ in relation to FAS 140
Transactions:
that it had no duty to question the subject matter of the opinion
requested by Andersen;
that, although they had no duty to do so, Vinson & Elkins
attorneys informed both Andersen and Enron of the firm's belief
that Andersen was asking for the wrong opinion;
348. Rapoport & Dharan, Enron and the Business World, in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIAscoS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 95.
349. Wilkins, supra note 132, at 474.
350. Id.
351. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 1.
352. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 84.004 (2005). The rule addresses the
attorney's role when the attorney represents an organization, such as a
corporation, and learns that a representative commits a violation of a legal
obligation which might reasonably be imputed to the organization.
353. Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 2.
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that it was assured that, from an accounting standpoint, the
opinions requested by Enron and Andersen were then opinions
needed to support the legal isolation requirements of FAS 140. 3 54
With regard to the Sundance Industrial true sale
opinion, Vinson & Elkins assumed there was a valid
business purpose. While questioning this, the Examiner
acknowledged that Vinson & Elkins could argue that it was
entitled to rely on the assumption. Vinson & Elkins made
the assumption clear in its opinion. In any case, the
transfer of the Sonoma A Interest to Salomon Holding was
a true sale. It also added the "no recharacterization"
assumption to its opinion; it specifically referred to the TRS
element; and it had put and call options added to the
transaction. It was only then that it provided a true sale
opinion.
On other occasions, Vinson & Elkins refused to give
true sale opinions, sometimes despite a specific request to
do so. 355 It played a role in Enron providing fuller
disclosure, and it asked questions constantly about its role.
It sought to double-check with Enron and Andersen that a
true issuance opinion was sufficient. It received
reassurances from high levels within the client organization
and it deferred to their professional judgment, expertise,
and authority.
Vinson & Elkins put the client first, but it did not do
everything it was asked to do. Nor was commercialism
unconfined. For whatever reason, Enron began to switch its
FAS 140 opinion work to Andrews & Kurth in late 1998. As
a result, the latter's fees rose substantially thereafter. 356
Meanwhile, Vinson & Elkins' fees peaked in 2000 and
declined in 2001 by over $6.5 million (14%).
In short, the core value of independent professional
judgment manifestly did play a role in this particular
lawyer-client relationship. Of course, professional core
values-reputation, competence and expertise, judgment,
independence, confidentiality, and so on-are market
values. As Andersen's own lawyers put it in 2001,
354. Id. at 179-80.
355. Id. at 162 n.735.
356. See supra note 167.
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"Andersen Legal knows that for a lawyer his
professionalism, independence and integrity are his key
assets."357 So, it may be that commercial rather than
professional values were at play here. In addition, there is a
legitimate fear that managers shopping around for
compliant lawyers will induce a race to the bottom. 358 But
the case study suggests that decision- making-and
regulation-about the core value of independent
professional judgment can be safely left to the market:
clients, investors, creditors, third parties, the insurance
industry, and other market actors.
The Examiner had another theory to explain attorneys'
perceived "failure[s]": that "some of [the] attorneys saw
their role in very narrow terms, as an implementer, not a
counsellor. '" 359 Lawyers "seemed to focus only on how to
address a narrow question or simply to implement a
decision (or document a transaction)."36 0 This will now be
explored in the context of the second key core value.
B. Delivering Legality: Respect for the Rule of Law
Professional regulation seeks to foster "confidence in
the rule of law."361 Lawyers act for their clients "within the
bounds of the law, ' 362 and "each member of society is
entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in
accordance with the law."363 Thus, lawyers may help the
client achieve lawful objectives by any "legally permissible
357. Alberto Terol, Patrick Bignon & Tony Williams, Andersen Legal's
Approach to the New Economy, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE
OF LAW, 423, 429 (Jens Drolshammer & Michael Pfeifer eds., 2001). Before the
demise of Andersen, "Andersen Legal [had] approximately 3,400 lawyers
working in 36 countries worldwide . . . [and a turnover of $528 million]." Id. at
428. The same authors comment: "To suggest that law is not already a business
is bizarre." Id. at 428.
358. Gordon, supra note 21, at 779.
359. Final Report, supra note 72, at 115. Although the Examiner gives
examples in support of these theories mainly in connection with Enron's in-
house attorneys, I believe he meant to include Vinson & Elkins as well.
360. Id.
361. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (2003).
362. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REPSONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
363. Id. EC 7-1.
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means;"36 4 the advocate may urge "any permissible
construction of the law favorable to his client, without
regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that
the construction will ultimately prevail. '36 5 There are
limits, but they are minimal. A belief that conduct is or will
be unlawful entitles the lawyer to withdraw. 366 And while,
under the Code, a lawyer may not assert "a position in
litigation that is frivolous" 367 under the Rules, a belief that
the client's position will not ultimately prevail does not
make an action frivolous. 368
The emphasis, therefore, is very much on the lawyer
furthering the client's objectives as determined by the
client. 36 9 Thus, the lawyer may continue with the
representation even if the client pursues a course of conduct
"contrary to the lawyer's advice;" 370 and "[a] lawyer shall
not intentionally [flail to seek the lawful objectives of his
client through reasonably available means."371 The "rule-of-
law" rhetoric is summed-up by the following: "In the final
analysis . . . the lawyer should always remember that the
decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the
client and not for himself."372
Large law firms-and the bar generally-argue that
core values should be protected because they serve both the
client and the public interest.373 The case study, by
contrast, reinforces the argument that the core value of
364. Id.
365. Id. EC 7-4.
366. Id. DR 7-101(B)(2).
367. Id. EC 7-4.
368. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2003).
369. Id. R. 1.2(a).
370. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1980).
371. Id. DR 7-101(A)(1).
372. Id. EC 7-8 (emphasis added).
373. Terol et al., supra note 357, at 429. Hans-Jurgen Hellwig, the current
CCBE President, was reported as criticizing the leading City of London law
practices for being "hypocritical in their approach to 'core values."' Linda Tsang,
Lawweek: What the legal journals are reporting this week, THE TIMES (LONDON),
Nov. 2, 2004, at Law 13.
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respect for the rule of law might be counter-productive and
against the public interest.374
Large law firms embrace complexity, like their clients.
What made the Enron bankruptcy possibly the "most
complex" in history375 was the corporate group structure.
When it filed for bankruptcy in December 2001, so did its
thirteen affiliates. 376 Court documents revealed that the
"affiliated group had more than 4,000 direct and indirect
subsidiaries. '377 But group structures are the norm, not the
exception, and such complexity of form and complexity of
transaction simply increases the need for lawyers to
traverse the various legal minefields. One of the reasons in-
house counsel use outside counsel is because they need
assistance in complex matters.378
To meet client needs and objectives and to make their
services competitive, large law firms also embrace
innovation, precedent-setting, and creativity. Corporate
clients are themselves legal constructs. Law is treated as
the "raw material to be worked upon"379 to further the
client's objectives, including creative compliance: using the
law to escape or to manage unwelcome regulation. A survey
of the large law firms mentioned in the Examiner's Final
Report, together with the firm that served as official
counsel for the Creditors' Committee, shows that Vinson &
Elkins is typical in delivering legality in this way.
All the firms emphasise their capacity and competence
to engage with complexity. Indeed, Milbank Tweed, Hedley
& McCloy was chosen as official counsel because of its
experience with large-scale bankruptcy and "its expertise in
374. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59
TEX. L. REV. 639, 685 (1981); Christopher J. Whelan, Ethical Conflicts in Legal
Practice: Creating Professional Responsibility, 52 S.C. L. REV. 697, 724 (2001).
375. Tabb, supra note 72, at 303.
376. The venue for the Enron bankruptcy was the Southern District of New
York because an Enron affiliated company petitioned for voluntary bankruptcy
just prior to Enron's filing. Id. at 305.
377. Id. at 303 n.1.
378. Michele M. Hedges, General Counsel and the Shifting Sea of Change, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIAscos AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 539, 550.
379. Doreen McBarnet, Law and Capital: The Role of Legal Form and Legal
Actors, 12 INT'L. J. SOC. L. 231, 238 (1984).
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structured finance and derivatives transactions."38 0 The
firm itself confirms this view. The Corporate Governance
Group "regularly advise boards and committees on their
most difficult and complex transactions and problems. s38 1
Its Global Corporate Group has "in-depth and practical
experience" in a range of transactions including "other
complex, cutting-edge transactions" and can provide "expert
assistance." 382
Shearman & Sterling points out that many of the
securitization transactions it describes "involved complex
tax and accounting issues" and that "[w]ith its global
presence, local law expertise and creative problem-solving
approach, [it] is uniquely qualified to help clients structure,
document and complete complex securitization and
derivatives transactions. '383
Corporate clients are also highly innovative. That
Enron was exceptionally so was well known for years before
the bankruptcy. It was named "the most innovative
company in the United States by Fortune magazine every
year between 1996 and 2001. ' 384 Large firm lawyers reflect
this characteristic too.
Shearman & Sterling is proud about its involvement in
"a great number of highly innovative transactions" noting
that it has "won various 'deal of the year' awards. ' 385 It has
worked on the "largest, most complex structured finance
transactions ever completed in the bank and capital
380. Tabb, supra note 72, at 322. Interestingly, Milbank refers to its
"extensive experience in the bankruptcy proceedings of Enron." Statement from
Milbank's web site that has since been updated or removed. A printout of the
statement is on file with author. Milbank was referred to in Regan's book, Eat
What You Kill. See generally REGAN, supra note 5.
381. http://www.milbank.com/en/PracticeAreas/GeneralCorporate-alpha.
htm.
382. Id.
383. Statement from Shearman & Sterling's web site that has since been
updated. A printout of the statement is on file with author. An updated, though
similar, statement can be found at http://www.shearman.com/strucfinance/
financial/.
384. Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron-The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 3, 11.
385. Statement from Shearman & Sterling's web site that has since been
updated or removed. A printout of the statement is on file with author.
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markets. ' 38 6 The Securitization and Derivatives Group
emphasises its "creative and innovative approach" and its
"work with clients to develop novel structured finance
products. ' 38 7 Indeed, "[s]tructuring innovative transactions
that provide unique benefits for major U.S. and non-U.S.
corporations is the hallmark [of the firm]". 388 The firm was
a "key participant in one of the first issuances of medium-
term notes by a special purpose vehicle that had previously
issued only receivables-backed commercial paper."38 9 Its
attorneys in New York, San Francisco, London, Paris, and
Germany "designed the unprecedented financing" of 20th
Century Fox's new films. 390  It has "pioneered the
development of off-balance-sheet transactions .. . .,391 The
firm "works closely with clients to develop novel structured
finance products that lower financing costs and achieve the
specific legal, tax, corporate and financial objectives of all
transaction parties.7392
Bracewell & Patterson "regularly advise issuers and
underwriters in the development and use of innovative
securities, structures and techniques . . . [o]ur lawyers are
often called upon to develop novel financing structures and
techniques to finance leveraged buyouts and other
negotiated or hostile transactions. ' 393 Milbank claims to be
a "leader in creating and applying innovative securitization
386. http://www.shearman.com/practices/detail.aspx?practiceid=37ada582-
dOd9-485b-b457-106bd86bbc95.
387. Statement from Shearman & Sterling's web site that has since been
updated. A printout of the statement is on file with author. An updated, though
similar, statement can be found at http://www.shearman.com/practices/detail.
aspx?practiceid=37ada582-dd9-485b-b457-106bd86bbc95.
388. http://www.shearman.com/strucfinance/financial/.
389. http://www.shearman.com/strucfinance/assetbackedpaper/.
390. Statement from Shearman & Sterling's web site that has since been
updated or removed. A printout of the statement is on file with author.
391. http://www.shearman.com/strucfinance/leasing/.
392. http://www.shearman.com/practices/detail.aspx?practiceid=37ada582-
dOd9-485b-b457-106bd86bbc95.
393. http://www.bracepatt.com/practices/practice-detail.asp?practiceID
=000006132140.
1128 [Vol. 54
2007] SOME REALISM ABO UT PROFESSIONALISM 1129
techniques . . . ."394 Its tax lawyers' expertise puts the firm
"on the cutting edge of market practice." 395
A precedent that is created by a law firm is, by any
definition, atypical (until others copy it). "Monetization" is a
good example. The term was used in "numerous
presentations to the Enron board, '396 but it did not have a
precise definition. Board members had "unclear or
conflicting understandings of the meaning of this term. 397
Indeed, Joseph C. Dilg testified that "I recall in discussion
that we had . . . some conversations about the term
monetization, whether anybody really knew what
monetization meant .... ,,398 Now, Vinson & Elkins refer to
it on their website as something it can offer clients.3 99 But
so does Shearman & Sterling, for whom asset monetization
is described as "a specialty."400 It has represented Citibank,
Deutsche Bank, and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette in the
"monetization of client assets through bank and capital
market financings and related credit and equity
derivatives." 401 The precedent has become the norm.
According to Bracewell & Patterson,
[o]ver the past 20 years . . . many businesses have, for a
variety of reasons, rejected traditional forms of debt capital
and turned to more creative methods of finance such as
monetizations and other types of off-balance sheet finance. As
these new debt structures evolve, our firm remains at the
forefront though its representation of both the users and
providers of these innovative products.40 2
394. http://www.milbank.com/en/PracticeAreas/SecuritizationStructured
Finance-alpha.htm.
395. http://www.milbank.com/enPracticeAreas/Tax-alpha.htm.
396. Final Report, supra note 72, at 105.
397. Id. at 106.
398. Id. at 106 n.209.
399. Statement from Vinson & Elkins' web site that has since been updated
or removed. A printout of the statement is on file with author.
400. Statement from Shearman & Sterling's web site that has since been
updated or removed. A printout of the statement is on file with author.
401. Statement from Shearman & Sterling's web site that has since been
updated or removed. A printout of the statement is on file with author.
402. Statement from Bracewell & Patterson's web site that has since been
updated or removed. A printout of the statement is on file with author.
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Creativity is routine in large firms too. According to
Shearman & Sterling, "In today's marketplace, derivatives
are an integral part of many structured transactions
designed to achieve complex regulatory, tax, capital,
accounting, risk management and financing objectives." 40 3
Milbank's Leveraged Finance Practice lawyers work as a
team whose depth and experience across a range of
substantive legal disciplines "enhances our ability to find
creative solutions to our client's business challenges. 404
Shearman & Sterling has "created structures . . . in
jurisdictions in which legal impediments had previously
made such transactions impractical."405 It represented the
arranger in a lease financing for Mazda: "The transaction
combined a leasing structure with innovative derivative
products employed to overcome certain enforceability
limitations under Japanese law."406
Kirkland & Ellis will deliver "the crucial legal opinions
on matters such as bankruptcy consolidation, true sale, and
tax treatment."407 It also implicitly guarantees the success
of its creative compliance. It states that it can obtain
preliminary views from rating agencies regarding "novel
issues on a 'no-name' basis.408 These informal contacts can
greatly assist clients in planning a novel securitization."409
Precedent-setting, therefore, is standard large law firm
fare: what is typical is atypicality. Large law firms outsell
each other on creativity, innovation, and the ability to deal
with complexity. However, they are all "routine." Any one of
the above firms could have written the following (in fact it
was Milbank):
403. http://www.shearman.com/Practices[Detail.aspx?practicelD=5dlad7d4-
52f6-4589-aOad-061a9cd49197.
404. http://www.milbank.com/en/PracticeAreas/Securitization
StructuredFinancealpha.htm.
405. Statement from Shearman & Sterling's web site that has since been
updated or removed. A printout of the statement is on file with author.
406. Id.
407. http://www.kirkland.com/practiceAreas/subPracticeMain.aspx?
Corporate&practiceAreaH4AssetID=81978444&praticeAreaH4ID=234&subPra
cticeAreaH4AssetID=82031444&subPracticeAreaH4ID=805.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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We are routinely involved in the structuring and development of
pilot projects, model contracts and cutting edge transactions that
often become the market precedent for subsequent transactions..
. . [We are able] to devise creative and cost-efficient solutions to
the issues that arise in these complex transactions .... We seek to
achieve our clients' business goals while being sensitive to client
preferences as to the identity and number of individuals involved
in any particular aspect of the transaction. 4 10
Even the "good" firms adopt similar rhetoric. Fried
Frank, the firm that regarded the accounting rationale of
Enron's non-disclosure to be "too aggressive," describe
themselves as an "international law firm" which "are
continuing to provide innovative and imaginative solutions
to complex business and legal problems in the twenty-first
century."411 Solutions seem clearly to encompass creative
compliance: "At Fried Frank, we are best known for-and
take great pride in-our ability to craft sophisticated
solutions for complex issues and intricate business
transactions, frequently creating the precedents that othersfollow;"412 and zeal: "Innovative and creative on behalf of
our clients, our attorneys all demonstrate an unwavering
commitment to client service and to the achievement of our
clients' objectives."413 Even the Examiner's own firm, Alston
& Bird "provides creative solutions to client challenges ...
[i]n each of [more than a dozen legal] service areas, we offer
clients a track record virtually second to none in precedent-
setting work and successful results."41 4
In short, complexity, innovation, and creativity, in
order to solve-or prevent-client problems, are the routine
daily work that constitutes large firm corporate law
practice. The core values of independence and respect for
the rule of law legitimize such work, including creative
compliance, and it is the large law firm and its clients
which have the resources to take advantage. Creative
410. http://www.milbank.com/en/PracticeAreas/SecuritizationStructured
Finance-alpha.htm.
411. http://www.ffhsj.com/new-ffhsj.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005)
(emphasis added).
412. Id. (emphasis added).
413. Id. (emphasis added).
414. http://www.alston.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=service (last visited Feb.
15, 2005).
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compliance advances the interests of the client but, if it
results in legal policy failing, then it is, on the face of it,
against the public interest.
IV. SOME REALISM ABOUT PROFESSIONALISM
It is a truism that there will never be another Enron,
for Enron is no more; nor is Andersen. But there is still
Vinson & Elkins. Whether or not Vinson & Elkins is
ultimately found liable under any of the various potential
claims, the firm, by and large, appears to have escaped
relatively unscathed. 415 Most of the Vinson & Elkins
attorneys involved with Enron as a client appear still to be
with the firm. The Enron relationship partner, Joseph C.
Dilg, is now Vinson & Elkins' Managing Partner.
This Article has not sought to address legal liabilities
as such, nor, by implication, ask whether Vinson & Elkins
should or should not be blamed. It has not reviewed in
detail all the transactions in which Vinson & Elkins played
a role 416 and it has not tried to unravel the "problem" at
Enron. Rather, it has focused on the core values and
ideologies of professionalism, libertarianism, and
commercialism, and the tensions between them. It has
focussed on legal opinion practice and the provision of
opinions by Vinson & Elkins. The Final Report provides so
much detail about the Vinson & Elkins-Enron relationship
that, while it is only a single law firm-client case study, it
415. Vinson & Elkins is a defendant in the Enron multistate litigation. In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp.2d 549, 564 (S.D.
Tex. 2002). In June 2006, it was announced that the firm had agreed to pay $30
million to Enron Corp's estate. Michael Orey, Lawyers: Enron's Last Mystery?,
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June 1, 2006, http://businessweek.com/investor/content/
may2006/pi20060531_972686.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). The settlement
included the return of $10.5 million in fees earned by the firm in the three
months before the bankruptcy. The firm also waived its claim for $3.9 million in
fees billed to Enron. John Roper, Vinson & Elkins settles with Enron for $30
million, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 2, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.mpl/special/enron/3921779.
416. While it has touched on most of the transactions, it has totally ignored
the tax opinions provided by Vinson & Elkins. The Examiner was critical of
these, stating that the various transactions had no identified business purpose.
See Final Report, supra note 72, app. C, at 91-107. For a full review of the tax
issues, see generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG. (Comm.
Print 2003).
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provides invaluable insights into the context of large law
firm practice.
On the surface, prior to the bankruptcy, Enron
appeared to be a typical, large corporation. The Board was
"top-notch," highly respected and, no doubt, envied by
others. It had all the proper committees and policies in
place. The compensation structure "was not atypical in
scope or design as compared to programs of other large
public companies at the time."417 The motivations were
normal too, including the manipulation of earnings and
cash flows and the "allure" of the SPE transactions. 418
Enron was advised by the "best" professionals: a "Big 5"
accounting firm, a "world-class" 419  in-house legal
department, and "hundreds of [outside] law firms" 420 which,
like Vinson & Elkins, are amongst the "Best Lawyers in
America."421 As far as the market was concerned, Enron
was much admired.422 Its shares were being recommended
right up to the last moment. 423 Whatever the shortcomings
in the public disclosure documents of Enron, few analysts
spotted them, despite their professed expertise. 424 In short,
417. Final Report, supra note 72, at 92.
418. Id. at 93.
419. Id. app. C, at 16.
420. Id. app. C, at 15 (quoting sworn testimony of Rex Rogers); Id. app. C, at
48.
421. Vinson & Elkins Rankings and Awards, supra note 120.
422. In 2000, Fortune ranked Enron 25th among "the world's most admired
companies." Nicholas Stein, The World's Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE,
Oct. 2, 2000, at 184.
423. See Final Report, supra note 72, at 83 n.142.
424. See David Millon, Who "Caused" the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 309, 321 (2003) ("Despite the steady decline in Enron's share price
during 2001, analysts following the company continued to be optimistic about
its prospects."). To see what the analysts said, see id. at 321-24. See also Final
Report, supra note 72, at 83 n.142 ("We're pretty much pounding the table on
Enron right now today [June 2001]. It's a company with the best fundamentals
in the industry. But right now we think it also has compelling valuation at
these levels.") (quoting Raymond Niles of Salomon Smith Barney). But see Bala
G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron's Reporting of Revenues
and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 97, 98, (analyzing "several forensic accounting
red flags" in Enron's financial statements). See also THE ESSAYS OF WARREN
BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA (Lawrence A. Cunningham ed.,
2001).
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Vinson & Elkins' relationship with Enron, when viewed in
this context, was, to all intents and purposes, probably not
atypical.
Indeed, Enron itself is atypical mainly through the lens
of hindsight. The bankruptcy was a horror story but what
we know about Enron, its officers, employees, and advisers
from the Examiner's Final Report is a "post-hoc horror
stor[y] about what ha[d] gone wrong."425 Liabilities in such
circumstances may well follow, depending on how the
evidence is presented and received and what expert's
opinion the fact-finder prefers. What did follow Enron,
however, was a rush to judgment and a voluminous legal
literature in which the tensions between professionalism,
libertarianism, and commercialism were, once again, to the
fore. 4 26
In this Article, by contrast, assumptions have been
questioned about key core values that exist in the context of
current large firm practice. Professionalism, libertarianism,
and commercialism may all play a significant part in legal
practice, but they need to be de-mystified as do the
everyday realities of large firm practice. Large firm
corporate law practice routinely comprises complexity,
creativity, and precedent-setting. It involves structuring
transactions, designing contracts, and avoiding unwelcome
regulations. It also entails making judgments in a world
where there can be honest-and dishonest-differences of
opinion between sets of professionals and others about how
to achieve objectives which are determined predominantly
by the client.
The Enron case study reminds us that law, whatever its
form, is material which can be worked upon. Corporate
lawyers are legal realists and working on the law is what
they do. To control this kind of lawyer behavior requires a
shift in the spotlight, away from the specifics of professional
regulation and the law of lawyering, for that is too narrow a
focus, and onto the law itself more generally. What should
be the regulatory response to creative compliance? How can
425. Nelson, supra note 65, at 479.
426. Gordon, supra note 21, at 768-74 (reviewing "Some Excuses for What
the Lawyers Did.").
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law prevent the exploitation of "regulatory black hole[s]" 427
or grey areas? How can law prevent lawyers from being
lawyers, formalist in an indeterminate legal world? Are
large firm lawyers and their clients, via creative
compliance, beyond legal control? 428
In the Enron case, as in most legal practice one would
hope, there seems to be little evidence of flagrant breaches
of law or professional regulation by Vinson & Elkins or
other outside counsel. 429 Law firms and in-house legal
departments may have a commitment to ethical behavior;
they are increasingly turning to ethics advisors and
"compliance specialists."430  The greatest challenge to
regulators therefore is not the professional regulation of
corporate lawyers' core values-the market can do that. Nor
is it to expect lawyers to behave ethically,431 despite
libertarianism or commercialism. Getting lawyers to be
'good' is not a problem of professionalism; it is not a
problem of professional regulation; rather it is a problem of
the law itself. What is needed is law which can reduce the
supply and demand for creative compliance, and can
overcome the barriers to effective enforcement. 43 2 While it
427. It has been argued that Enron collapsed partly because of derivatives,
"a regulatory black hole." Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 62, at 169, 170.
428. See McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 296, at 848.
429. There is little doubt that creative accounting in the Enron case went
beyond creative compliance to flagrant abuses and fraud.
430. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law
Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 559 (2002).
431. See generally Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of
Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629 (2002).
432. Intriguingly, an attempt to criminalize creative compliance, in the
context of lawyers providing advice on the options available to clients seeking
financing options for their long-term medical needs, was in effect for only 216
days. See Lisa Schreiber Joire, After New York State Bar Association v. Reno:
Ethical Problems in Limited Medicaid Estate Planning, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 789 (1999). I am grateful to Dean Eveland for referring me to this
article. Of course, there are non-legal and non-market mechanisms of control
which, in the context of law practice, might be far more important. See W.
Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1956-57 (2001); Whelan,
supra note 374, at 698; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does
Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1997).
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may be relatively easy to catch and convict professional
deviants who break clear laws, what kind of law can control
those who claim that their actions are perfectly legal, and
in compliance with the law?
What is needed appears to be a new kind of law,
whereby professionals (and others) internalise its norms.
The case study suggests that enforcement of legal norms
may be more difficult when corporate lawyers adhere to
professional core values. The goal of the new law is
somehow to make its enforcement unnecessary. Some might
characterise this kind of law as "soft law"; others have
created the term "transcendental regulation."433 The real
challenge is to identify what form such 'transcendental
regulation' could take.
433. See Whelan, supra note 374, at 725-26. Transcendental regulation
transcends legal form and cuts through the foundations of creative compliance.
The phrase arose out of the work of McBarnet and Whelan, supra note 296, at
873.
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